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Davis: Taxi! Why Hailing a New Idea About Public Accommodation Laws May

TAXI! WHY HAILING A NEW IDEA ABOUT
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAWS MAY BE
EASIER THAN HAILING A TAXI
I.

INTRODUCTION
"TAXI!"

In recent years, many of the Nation's largest cities have reported
instances of race discrimination by taxicab drivers.' After the widely
publicized complaint made by popular actor Danny Glover that he was
unable to hail a cab while visiting his daughter in Harlem, Former New
York City Mayor, Rudy Giuliani, ordered undercover police officers to
"put the sting on" taxi drivers who discriminate against black Americans
trying to hail cabs. 2 Five cabs passed the black actor while he waited
curbside for service. 3 Chicago has also experienced a plethora of
difficulty with its own cab fleet, including refusals to serve
neighborhoods mostly occupied by minority residents and refusing
black American fares altogether. 4 Chicago's Commerce Commission has
recently implemented a "Fare-A-Day" program that requires cabs to take
at least one fare a day to an underserved (and mostly minority)
neighborhood.5 Yet, many Chicago cabbies are outraged with the
program, claiming that the program threatens drivers' safety by
requiring them to take fares in dangerous parts of the city. 6 Washington,
D.C., also has been plagued with continuous litigation regarding taxicab
discrimination over the past decade. 7 As a result of mounting concerns,

Stuart Taylor, Jr., Cabbies, Cops, Pizza Deliveries, and Racial Profiling, NAT'L J. (June 20,
2000), at http://www.the atlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2000-06-20.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2002); see also Marcus Cole, Medallion Monopoly Drives Taxicab Racism, 9 LIBERTY & L.
(Feb. 2000), at http://www.ij.org/publications/liberty/2000/9_1_00_e.asp (last visited
Oct. 20, 2002).
2
Elisabeth Bumiller, Cabbies Who Bypass Blacks Will Lose Cars, Giuliani Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1999, at Al; see also Monte Williams, Danny Glover Says Cabbies DiscriminatedAgain
Him, id., Nov. 4, 1999, at B8.
3
Bumiller, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 2.
4
John Stinneford, Cabbies Struck for Economic Liberty; City's New Taxi Law is a Lemon,
CHI. TRIB., July 8, 2001, at C19; see also Jill Blackman, Cab Driver Sues City Over AntiDiscriminationLaw, id., May 16, 2000, at M1; Clarence Page, Putting a Stop to Taxicab Bias, id.,
Nov. 17, 1999, at C31.
5
Blackman, supra note 4; Page, supra note 4; Stinneford, supra note 4.
6
Blackman, supra note 4; Page, supra note 4; Stinneford, supra note 4.
7
See Floyd-Mayers v. Am. Cab Co., 732 F. Supp 243 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see, e.g.,
WASHINGTON LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS; PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS PROJECT, at http://www.washlaw.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2002) (listing
cases filed by the committee which include Green v. Your Way Taxi (D.D.C) (purporting
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Washington, D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams met with representatives of
the metropolitan area taxicab drivers, as well as concerned citizens, to
discuss the issue.8 Mayor Williams agreed that a balance must be struck
between the taxi drivers' safety and the civil rights of citizens. 9
Congress passed Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 ("Act of
1964") to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation. However, for reasons examined in this Note, the Act of
1964 is rarely used to litigate claims of race discrimination by taxi
drivers." Furthermore, states have a varying degree of their own public
accommodation statutes, leaving many to question whether common
carriers are even included.12
Municipal policies have also been
developed to combat the problem, some demanding automatic
confiscation of the cab if a complaint is alleged, others requiring cab
drivers to take at least one fare a day to underserved neighborhoods or
face suspension. 13 Many of these policies fail to balance the interests of
drivers, consumers, and taxi medallion owners in the attempt to
eradicate racial discrimination in the taxi industry.
This Note examines Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with
regard to public accommodation laws and common carriers.
Specifically, this Note discusses why racial discrimination exists in
taxicab service and how modern public accommodation laws and
municipal polices often fail at addressing the issue. Part II of this Note
examines the history of public accommodation laws beginning from the
passage of the civil rights acts after the Civil War, up to the effects of the
decisions in The Civil Rights Cases14 and Plessy v. Ferguson.15 This Part
also discusses the exclusion of "duty to serve" and the emergence of

that plaintiff was refused a ride because of his race); Jones v. Standard Taxi Cab (D.D.C)
(arguing that plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of race and her residence)); see
also Bolden v. J & R Inc., No. 99-1255 (6K), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3231 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affd
on other grounds, 135 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (arguing that Bolden was
discriminated against on the basis of race when the cab driver refused to service him).
8
Emory Julian Mills, Taxi Troubles: Balancing Safety, Civil Rights, THE COMMON
DENOMINATOR (Nov. 29, 1999), at http://www.thecommondenominator.com/112999new8.htnd (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
9

Id.

10
11

42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 217-36 and accompanying text.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
163 U.S. 537 (1896); see infra Part II.

12
13
14
15
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contractual rights. 16 Part III discusses the elements necessary to prove a
case of taxicab discrimination and evaluates the different theories and
17
Part IV
dynamics behind race discrimination by taxicab drivers.
examines modem civil rights laws, exploring the reasons for the
18
ambiguity in public accommodation laws regarding common carriers.
Furthermore, this Part discusses why modern public accommodation
laws and policies do not suffice in combating racial discrimination in the
taxicab industry. 19 Finally, by presenting a model municipal antidiscrimination policy for taxicab service, as well as a model state public
accommodation statute that extricates language from effective state
statutes regarding discrimination in common carriers, Part V suggests a
20
reemergence of the common law "duty to serve."
II.

THE FLAT TIRE: THE ORIGINAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THE BLOWOUTS
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND PLESSY V. FERGUSON

Congress passed multiple Civil Rights Acts from 1866 to 1875.21 The
first of these acts, enacted on March 13, 1866, was reenacted on April 9th

16
17
18
19
20

21

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 227 (Albert P.

Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., 1968) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN
NEGRO]; see LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 655 (2d ed. 1995). The Civil Rights Acts of 1866,

1870, 1871, and 1875 were laws passed by Congress after the Civil War to guarantee the
rights of blacks. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra. The first civil rights act passed by Congress
after the Reconstruction period was the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Id. The 1957 Act, through
empowering the Department of Justice to seek injunctions against any deprivation of
voting rights, was designed to secure the right to vote for African Americans. Id. In
addition, the Act established a Civil Rights Division and a Commission to investigate civil
rights violations. Id.; see also JOHN R. HOWARD, THE SHIFTING WIND: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CIVIL RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO BROWN 54 (1999). The Civil Rights Act of

1866 was the first act that specifically addressed the black codes. HOWARD, supra.
President Johnson vetoed the bill, which eventually became the Act of 1866, because "the
measure represented an unprecedented intrusion of the Federal Government into local
affairs." Id. The Act was the first major piece of legislation passed over presidential veto.
Id. at 53. The second Act, the Enforcement Act of 1870, criminalized official and private
interference with voting or registering to vote to help ensure compliance with the newly
enacted Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 64. To strengthen the Enforcement Act, Congress
passed the Klan Act of 1871, which aimed at the group by prohibiting obstruction of law
via the use of force, intimidation, or threat. Id. at 65. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
prohibited discrimination on racial grounds in the operation of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement. Id. at 68.
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of that same year over President Andrew Johnson's veto.22 This Act was
designed to safeguard the newly emancipated slaves from
discrimination by giving African Americans "full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings ...as is enjoyed by white citizens." 23 The last of
the acts, and the last until 1957, included a public accommodation
section which stated:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and
other places of public amusement; subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color,
regardless of any previous conditions of servitude.24
Yet, even before these Acts, there was a common law notion of "duty
to serve" which, for the purposes of this Note, should be analyzed before
a full evaluation of the legal framework of public accommodation laws
can be made. 25
A. Wanna Ride? Holding Oneself Out as Open to the Public and the Duty to
Serve
Early English cases defined a "common carrier" as "any man
26
undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently."
The decisive part of whether one was a common carrier was "whether
one held oneself out as available to take on business from anyone in the

22 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN
NEGRO, supra note 21, at 229-30.
23

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 228 (quoting the original

Civil Rights Act of 1866).
24

See Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN

NEGRO, supranote 21, at 241.
23 See infra this Part, Part 1I.
26 See Gisbom v. Hurst, 91 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1710), cited in Joseph William Singer, No
Right to Exclude, Public Accommodations and Private Property,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1306-08
(1996) (explaining that "any man undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons
indifferently ... is, as to this privilege, a common carrier..."); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep.
1458 (K.B. 1701), cited in Singer, supra, at 1304-06 (explaining that "one that has made
profession of a public employment, is bound to the utmost extent of that employment to
the public").
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public." 27 American legal commentators in the early nineteenth century
agreed that the basic duty of common carriers is to serve the public. 28
Justice Joseph Story, in his commentaries regarding the law of bailments,
explained the duty of common carriers as "to receive and carry all goods
offered for transportations upon receiving a suitable hire." 29 Justice
Story further defined a common carrier as one who performs his trade as
a public employee and whose obligation is to take passengers whenever
they offer their services. 30 Before new civil rights laws were passed
during the Reconstruction period, there was a general idea that holding
oneself out as open to the public requires one to fulfill the service
31
undertaken, especially when others rely on you to fulfill this obligation.
Contemporary definitions mirror the same idea, stating that a common
carrier is "a business or agency that is available to the public for
32
transportation of persons, goods, or messages."

27 Singer, supra note 26, at 1306-08. Singer believes that "common" and "public" are
synonyms and if they held themselves out to the public, then they were engaged in a public
trade or employment. Id.
2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERIcAN LAW 1826-1830, at 464-65 (photo reprint in
1971), cited in Singer, supra note 26, at 1312. Chancellor James Kent, in his commentaries,
defined common carriers as "those persons who undertake to carry goods generally, and
for all people indifferently, for hire," and further noted "[tihey are bound to do what is
required of them in the course of their employment, if they have the requisite convenience
to carry, and are offered a reasonable or customary price; and if they refuse without some
just ground, they are liable to an action." Id.; see also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
29 Singer, supra note 26, at 1312 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
BAILMENTS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW (1812)).
30
STORY, supra note 29, §§ 495-508. In his opinion in Jencks v. Coleman, 13 F. Cas. 442
(C.C.D.R.I. 1835), a case involving transportation of passengers on a steamboat, Justice
Story stated that
There is no doubt, that this steamboat is a common-carrier of
passengers for hire; and, therefore, the defendant, as commander, was
bound to take the plaintiff as a passenger on board, if he had suitable
accommodations, and there was no reasonable objection to the
character or conduct of the plaintiff.
Jencks, 13 F. Cas. at 443. Justice Story further listed examples of common carriers as
"innkeepers, farriers, and other carriers for common public employment." Id.
31 See Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 597 (Cal. 1867), which bases the duty to serve
the public on the "public policy" of providing "for the protection and security of the
travelers." Pinkerton, 33 Cal. at 597. Pinkerton suggests a conception of a social relationship
that understands the act of holding oneself out to the public as the voluntary acceptance of
a social role that creates a duty when others rely on one's fulfillment of that role. Id.
32 MERRIAM WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 88 (1996). Cf. id. at 104 (defining contract
carrier as "a transport line that carries persons or property to one or a limited number of
shippers").

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2003], Art. 5

934

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

Even though there appeared to be a common law duty to serve, the
law was often silent as to issues of race discrimination in public
accommodations. There were few statutes and little case law that fully
delved into the discussion of discrimination in public accommodations
until after the Civil War. 33 The first materials to scrupulously discuss the
issue were about railroad travel. 34 Edward Lillie Pierce's A Treatise on
American Railroad Law included a passage that extended access to places
of public accommodation to black passengers. 35 Yet, despite this attempt
to include black Americans in public accommodations, discrimination
still existed. 36 Even though scholarly and judicial opinions suggested
the duty to serve applied to businesses that held themselves out to the
public, racist implications after the Civil War led to a narrowing of
public accommodation law. 37 After the Civil War and emancipation, a

33 Singer, supra note 26, at 1334. Singer states that the first cases that expressly
addressed the question of obligation of common carriers were decided in 1858 and 1859.
Id. at 1331. He suggests the cases to mean that "in the North ... common carriers had
duties to serve free Negroes but that racial segregation in these facilities would constitute a
'reasonable regulation' and thus not constitute a violation of the duty to serve." Id. at 133132.
34

EDWARD LILLIE PIERCE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN RAILROAD LAW 489 (1857), cited in

Singer, supra note 26, at 1334 (explaining that Pierce's statement on race in public
accommodations was one of the first in the United States to explicitly confirm the right of
access to public accommodations to black Americans).
35 Id. Pierce wrote:
Duty of the company to receive Passengers and to carry them
according to its Professions. -The company is under a public duty, as a
common carrier of passengers, to receive all who offer themselves as
such and are ready to pay the usual fare, and is liable in damages to a
party whom it refuses to carry without a reasonable excuse. It may
decline to carry persons after its means of conveyance have been
exhausted, and refuse such as persist in not complying with its
reasonable regulations, or whose improper behavior-as by their
drunkenness, obscene language, or vulgar conduct-renders them an
annoyance to other passengers.
But it cannot make unreasonable
discrimination between persons soliciting its means of conveyance, as by
refusing them on account of personal dislike, their occupation, conditions in
life, complexion, race, nativity, political or ecclesiastical relations.
Id. at 1334-35 (emphasis added).
3
See Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520 (1858) (holding to the effect that common carriers could
not entirely refuse to serve African Americans; yet, in the 1890s when the Jim Crow laws
produced the separate but equal doctrine, so too did it produce an immunization from the
duty to serve); see also State v. Kimber, 3 Misc. 58 (Ct. Common Pleas 1859), explained in
Singer, supra note 26, at 1357. The Jim Crow Laws were justified with the absence of a right
to social equality and the emergence of property rights. Singer, supra note 26, at 1357.
37
Singer, supra note 26, at 1344; see McCrea v. Marsh, 78 Mass. 211 (1858) (establishing
the idea that places of entertainment were free to choose their customers at will). In
McCrea, the plaintiff bought a ticket to a theater and was refused admittance on the basis of
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right to exclude, which served to limit these newfound civil rights,
38
substituted the presumption of equal access.
B.

A Temporary Stop: The Passageof the Civil Rights Act of 1875

Although the Civil War and the Reconstruction period elevated
black Americans to the status of free citizens, little effort was put forth to
39
ensure the right to equal and full access of public accommodations.
During this era, racial hostility often manifested itself as a denial to
public accommodations. 40
States continued to perpetuate black

color. McCrea, 78 Mass. 211. The judge ruled that the ticket was only an executory
contract, and when the owner refused to allow him to enter, the owner intended not to
fulfill the contract, thus allowing an action on the contract and not a tort action. Id. at 212.
Singer further notes that actions taken after this ruling led to a narrowing of public
accommodation law, authorizing businesses to choose customers at will. Singer, supra note
26, at 1344. The presumption of access to public accommodations free from racial
discrimination was being reversed and eventually being replaced by a right to exclude. Id.
at 1345. The issue of public access was amalgamated in the issue of racial segregation, thus
limiting its separate struggle. Id.
38 Singer, supra note 26, at 1344. Singer notes that when the courts were forced to
address the issue of segregation in public accommodations, "the courts appeared to adopt
the position that the longstanding custom of racial segregation constituted a reasonable
regulation of property to protect the interests of the majority of patrons, while
acknowledging a duty to serve customers of all races." Id.; see LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF
SLAVERY, NEGRO IN FREE STATES 107-12 (1961). After the Civil War, establishments, even in
the North, did not provide access to African Americans in public accommodations, and
those that did were almost certain to segregate. Id.
39

EARL. M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 29

(1990). The country after the Civil War struggled to piece itself back together. Id. Many
Republicans who found themselves in power after the war focused their attention on
reconstruction of the Nation. Id. In the first decades after the completion of the war, the
Congress found itself contemplating federal action on civil rights as an aspect of
reconstruction policy and later proposing amendments to the Constitution to rectify
concerns of the unjust treatments of blacks. Id.
40

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM:
RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 94 (1996). Higginbotham suggests that

the Supreme Court continued to legitimize the resurrection of the inferiority precept of
African Americans by "blinding itself to the unequal treatment, and partly by creating
unnecessary legal doctrine that had harsh racial consequences." Id. Although formal law
of public accommodations made no distinctions based on race in the period after
Reconstruction, other laws were passed that did draw this distinction. Singer, supra note 26,
at 1336. A number of states passed laws prohibiting the immigration of free blacks into the
states. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at

26 (1988); see, e.g., Acts of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina 1864-1865,
reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 218. The Act of
South Carolina, better known as a "black code," stated that people who did not have a
known place of abode and some lawful and reputable employment would be punished for
the crime of "public grievance." Acts of the General Assembly of the State of South
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inferiority in many ways, in particular, through exclusion from equal
access to major public accommodations, such as railways. 41 Since the
inception of the United States, there has been a constant struggle by
many minority Americans to acquire equal access to public
accommodations. 42 Congress eventually took up this debate in the 1870s
and, despite intense hostility and tension, passed the Civil Rights Act of
1875 to provide black Americans with equal access to public
43
accommodations.
However, despite its clear and precise language entitling full and
equal enjoyment of public accommodations, the passage of the 1875 Act
failed to secure black Americans' access to public accommodations. 44 As

Carolina 1864-1865, reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at
218. These statutes are evidence of the most vituperative type of law, which gave places of
public accommodation the right to exclude free blacks from their establishments. Singer,
supra note 26, at 1336.
41
Patricia Hagler Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender, and the Evolution of
Segregated Transit Law in tie Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 995 (1995);
see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 94. Higginbotham notes that the "unfair and unjust
treatment of African-Americans in public accommodations during the 1860's, 1870's, and
1880's was not much different from the treatment they received during the antebellum
period." HIGGINBOTHAM, supranote 40, at 95; see, e.g., Smoot v. Ky. Cent. R.R. Co., 13 F. 337
(C.C.D. Ky. 1882). Belle Smoot purchased a ticket in the first class ladies' car and was
refused entrance on the basis of race. Smoot, 13 F. at 340. Smoot sued under the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 and was denied damages, based on the court's rationale that the
prohibitions of the Civil Rights Act applied only to state action, not to those of individuals.
Id. at 338. For examples of cases that show the evolution of the "separate but equal"
doctrine, see also Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); Green v. City of Bridgeton, 10 F. Cas. 1090
(S.D. Ga. 1879); United States v. Dodge, 25 F. Cas. 882 (W.D. Tex. 1877); Chicago & N. W. R.R.
Co. v. Williams, 55 Il. 185 (Ill. 1870); Westchester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (Pa.
1867).
42
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 95. Higginbotham points out the "continuous
tension among some white Americans as to whether hatred of African-Americans is to be
sanctioned or whether the state and federal government must assure African-Americans
the full panoply of citizenship rights, including equal access to public accommodations."
Id.
43
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 14 Stat. 27, reprinted in CIvIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN
NEGRO, supra note 21, at 241. The preamble of the 1875 act states that equality was "the
appropriate object of legislation." Id.
44
Id. at 218. The Act contained a provision which stated:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any
previous condition of servitude.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss3/5

Davis: Taxi! Why Hailing a New Idea About Public Accommodation Laws May

2003]

PublicAccommodation Laws

937

a result of increased class tensions and the inability of judge-made
doctrines to address these tensions of interracial contracts, a vast
45
majority of states adopted their own public accommodation laws.
Determination of the status of black Americans took shape gradually
under the influence of economic and political conflicts among the
divided whites-conflicts that were eventually resolved at the expense of
the black Americans. 46 For example, many of the states interpreted the
statutes in a manner that defined separate accommodations as being
equal. 47 These new separate accommodation laws and segregation codes
were comparable to the black codes of the earlier era.48 This practice was
judged sufficient to comply with the mandate of equal service and
illustrated how custom and actual practice diverged from the formal

Id. at 241. Despite the clear language of this Act, many African Americans experienced
racial violence that was analogous to the restoration and redemption governments in the
South. HOWARD, supra note 21, at 125. For example, in April 1873, after a disputed
gubernatorial election in Louisiana, an army of Klan members stormed the Courthouse in
Grant Parish, Louisiana, and killed and mutilated the bodies of at least sixty freed men.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 88. Investigators reported that the mob viewed the
conflict over the local political offices as a "test of white supremacy" and joined with other
mobs to restore white rule. Id. Following a two-month trial, the jury acquitted one
defendant and was unable to reach a verdict on the other nine. Id. On retrial, only three
were convicted of conspiracy and the eight remaining were acquitted of the murder
charges. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544-45 (1876).
45 Minter, supra note 41, at 1009. By 1896, all but three states in the former ConfederacySouth Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia-enacted laws separating railroad cars on the
basis of race. Id. The Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson removed any barrier to
their enforcement. Id.; see Louisiana Railway Accommodations Act, Louisiana Laws, 1890,
No. 111, 152-54, reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 297.
Section 1 of the Act stated:
[T]hat all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in
this State, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the
white, and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches
for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a
partition so as to secure separate accommodations ....
Louisiana Railway Accommodations Act, Louisiana Laws, 1890, No. 111, 152-54, reprinted
in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 297.
46
C. VANN WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 7 (1957).

47 See generally Act of Mar. 24, 1875, ch. 130 § 1 Tenn. Pub. Acts (prohibiting racial
discrimination by railroads and other common carriers), referenced in Singer, supra note 26,
at 1356-57. For example, in response to the federal public accommodations act, Tennessee
passed an anti-public accommodation act that released businesses from "any obligation to
entertain, carry or admit, any person, whom he shall for any reason, choose not to
entertain, carry or admit." Singer, supra note 26, at 1356. Furthermore, these businesses
could "control the access and admission or exclusion of persons in any manner as perfect
and complete as that of the owners of any private house, carriage, or private theater, or
places of amusement for his family." Id.
48 WOODWARD, supra note 46, at 7.
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law. 49 As a result of the ambiguous, often changing, and confusing legal
treatment of the public accommodation laws, and because black
Americans began to challenge the new laws under the guise of the Act of
1875, the Supreme Court was forced to address the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in its landmark decision of The Civil Rights
50
Cases.
C. A Bump in the Road: The Civil Rights Cases
The Civil Rights Cases were a consolidation of five lower court cases,
which attempted to seek redress for violations of unequal treatment of
black Americans. 51 The cases arose in five states and involved charges of
denial of public accommodations in inns, denial of seats in theaters, and
the unequal treatment of black Americans who sought to ride in the
ladies' car of a train.5 2 These cases provided the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to affirm the national antidiscrimination policy and, more
53
specifically, to condemn racism in the area of public accommodations.
On their face, these consolidated cases determined whether the Supreme
Court was willing to assure equal dignity to black Americans in places of
public accommodation, and the clear answer that emerged was that it
was not.54
The formal legal issue that arose in these cases was whether
Congress had the authority, under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth

Singer, supra note 26, at 1357. For example, the Tennessee anti-public accommodation
act abrogated the duty to serve. Id. at 1356. Inns, common carriers, and places of
entertainment were released from "any obligation to entertain, carry or admit, any person,
whom he shall for any reason, choose not to entertain, carry or admit." Id. (citing 1875
Tenn. Pub. Acts 216-17).
50
109 U.S. 3 (1883). The decision was a compilation of cases involving alleged private
racial discrimination. Id. In each of these cases, persons of color were denied access to
public facilities covered under the 1875 act. Id. The Supreme Court found no authority in
the Constitution for the passage of the law and declared the Act void. Id.
51
Id. at 3. Five cases were consolidated under the name of the Civil Rights Cases to
address the issues of the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875-United States v.
Stanley, United States v. Ryan, United States v. Nichols, United States v. Singleton, and Robinson
& Wife v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad Co. Id.; see also ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA
LUCK GRAHAM, THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 46 (1995).
52
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3. These states include: Kansas, Missouri, California,
New York, and Tennessee. Id.
53 HIGGINBOTHAM, supranote 40, at 98.
5
Id. at 104. Higginbotham notes that the Court's reasoning in the cases "demonstrates
that it was unwilling to sanction federal protection and guarantees for rights for African
Americans, whereas previously it had no reluctance to enforce the total repression of
African Americans." Id.
49
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Amendment, to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1875, prohibiting
discrimination in public accommodations.55
The Court held that
Congress could not prohibit racial discrimination, asserting that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the power to legislate
subjects that are within the domain of state legislation, nor does it
authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation
of private rights.5 6 The opinion advocated that a "social right, rather
than a civil right, was involved in these cases ... [and] this social right
... was ... used to preclude African Americans from equal treatment in
public accommodations regardless of their individual character or
merit."57 Justice Bradley further opined that when African Americans
were denied access to public accommodations, the denial had nothing to
do with any badge or incidence of slavery or servitude prohibited by the
Thirteenth Amendment, nor did it involve the privileges and immunities
and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
The creation of a "racially hostile constitutional doctrine" resulting
from this decision did not go unnoticed by all members of the Court.5 9
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the first sentence of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares that all persons born or
naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States and of
the state wherein they reside, gave Congress the power to declare,
through legislation, the civil rights of citizens according to the
Amendment's fifth section. 60 Harlan concluded that one of these civil

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 11.
57
Id. at 3.
58
Id. at 24. Bradley wrote:
[1It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to
make as to the guest he will entertain, or as to the people he will take
into his coach or cab or car or admit to his concert of theatre or deal with
in other matters or intercourse or business.
Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
59
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 106. The Court could have found that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to declare, through legislation, what the civil rights
of citizens were. Id. But, the Court disregarded the first sentence of the Amendment,
which purports that the citizens are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and the
state in which they reside, and instead focused solely on the validity of the Amendment as
a grantor of universal rights. Id.
6
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 45-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan stated,
"I am of the opinion that such discrimination practised [sic] by corporations and
individuals in exercise of their public or quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude the
55
56
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rights was freedom from racial discrimination. 61 Yet, Harlan's ideas did
62
not persuade the rest of the Court.
The decision in The Civil Rights Cases hindered the civil rights
movement of black Americans by "distorting the definition of social
rights." 63 The decision was "oblivious ... to the precept of black
inferiority and the enforcement mechanisms used by whites to make
African Americans powerless." 64 This effort to revitalize the precept of
black inferiority, however, could be seen as intentional, in light of the
fact that seven years later the Court legitimized the tolerance of unequal
6
treatment with the doctrine known as "separate but equal." 5
D. The Swallowing Pothole: The Decision of Plessy v. Ferguson and the
"Separate But Equal" Doctrine in Public Accommodations
As the Reconstruction Acts and their enforcement slowly waned,
political forces in the South began to reassert the discriminatory precepts
that were once the focus of the new legislation. 66 During this period, also
known as the Jim Crow era, the movement to achieve racial equality

imposition of which Congress may prevent under its power, by appropriate legislation."
Id. at 43.
61

62

Id.at 48.
Id.at 11.

63 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 106. Higginbotham implies that the ruling in the
Civil Rights Cases was advocated on fictitious, unfounded constitutional principles. Id.
Justice Bradley proposed the idea that what was at stake in the cases was not a civil right
but a "social right." Id. The "social right" notion was then used to preclude blacks from
equal treatment in public accommodations. Id. Furthermore, Higginbotham notes that the
majority could have found, as Harlan noted in his dissent, that the first sentence in the
Fourteenth Amendment, which states that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the
State where they reside," gave Congress the power to declare the civil rights of the citizens.
Id. "The Court's relative disregard of the first section of section 1 and its focus solely on the
second sentence diluted the vitality of the Amendment as a guarantor of universal civil
rights." Id.
64
65

Id. at 106.
Id. at 107.

66 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 658. Although Congress attempted to give force
to the new amendments to the Constitution passed during Reconstruction to ensure rights
of blacks (Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), the Supreme Court did not
follow suit. Id. The Court did not construe the new amendments broadly, nor did they
support legislation designed to enforce them. Id. In United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1883), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, major provisions of the Civil Rights Acts
passed in 1871 and 1875 were nullified. Id. In the South, where ninety percent of the
minority population lived, states began to enact laws that reimposed an inferior legal status
that commanded a strict separation of races. Id.
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came to a standstill with the enactment of laws that reimposed the idea
of black inferiority. 67 The segregation statutes of the 1890s put black
Americans back into an "ambiguous" status, which had existed
immediately after the Civil War. 68 One such state statute was the subject
of controversy in Plessy v. Ferguson, arguably the most important civil
rights case ever to be decided by the Supreme Court.69
In 1868, Louisiana adopted a number of measures to promote legal
equality. 7° Black Americans were given "the same civil, political, and
public rights and privileges, including the equal access to public
conveyances and all places of business, or of public resort, or for which a
license is required and equal educational opportunity" as white
Americans. 71 However, less than twenty years later, segregation laws
replaced the idea of equality and revived the idea of black inferiority. 72
The Louisiana Railway Act, enacted in 1890, required segregation on
railroads and was premised on notions of black inferiority. 73 This new
statute was an example of how white-controlled southern legislatures
attempted to "assure white superiority" by requiring segregation of the

67 Laws of Tennessee, 1901, Ch. 7, House Bill No. 7, at 9, reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 315. The Tennessee Jim Crow Law in education is
a typical example of Jim Crow legislation enacted throughout the South. Section I
provides: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That hereafter
it shall be unlawful for any school, academy, college or other place of learning to allow
white and colored persons to attend the same school, academy, college or other place of
learning." Id.
68 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 109. Higginbotham notes that within twenty years
after the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the first circular civil rights journey was complete: "from
non-rights to rights to non-rights again." Id.
69 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see Louisiana Railway Accommodations Act,
Louisiana Laws, 1890, No. 111, 152-54, reprintedin CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO,
supra note 21, at 29.
70 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 109. See generally LA. CONST. of 1868, arts. I, XIII,
CXXXV (giving African Americans the same civil, political, and public rights, as well as
including equal access to public conveyances and equal educational opportunities as
whites).
71 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40,at 109-10.
72 Id. at 110.
73 Louisiana Railway Accommodations Act, Louisiana Laws, 1890, No. 111, 152-54,
reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 297. The statute
provided:
[A1II railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this
State, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white,
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for
each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a
partition so as to secure separate accommodations ....
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races. 74 The true meaning of the statute would become obvious when its
constitutionality was challenged seven years later.75
Homer Adolph Plessy was arrested for refusing to ride in the colored
coach on a Louisiana railway. 76 After being imprisoned in New Orleans
for a violation of the Louisiana Railway Act of 1890, Plessy instituted an
action based on the constitutionality of the statute, claiming it violated
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 77 The majority opinion in
Plessy opined that segregation in public accommodations did not amount
to servitude or a state of bondage for black Americans. 78 After rejecting
the Thirteenth Amendment argument, the majority also concluded that
the statute's use of a legal distinction founded in the color of the two
races was not violative of the Constitution and, furthermore, found no
validity in the argument that racial segregation stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. 79 Ironically, the Court relied on a number of
cases that were decided prior to the passage of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments when constructing its decision. 80

74 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 111. Higginbotham suggests that 1890 segregation
law was premised on notions of black inferiority and "[ilnteraction with whites on an equal
basis challenged these notions and threatened to overthrow the racial thinking that
developed during slavery." Id. at 110-11. Consequently, the white-controlled legislature
attempted to enforce the precept of black inferiority by enforcing their segregationist
statutes. Id. at 111.
75
See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (challenging the segregation
statute passed by Louisiana).
76
Id. at 541-42.
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white
and colored races-a distinction which is founded in the color of the
two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are
distinguishable from the other race by color-has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of
involuntary servitude.
Id. at 543.
77
Id. at 537. Homer Adolph Plessy, one-eighth African American and seven-eighths
white, was arrested for refusing to ride in the colored coach on a Louisiana railway. Id.
Plessy was forcibly ejected from the train and imprisoned in New Orleans for a violation of
the Railway Act of 1890. Id. The defendant, Ferguson, was the judge designated to
conduct the trial. Id. The pleas by Plessy to prohibit Ferguson from hearing the cases were
denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, and, thus, the Supreme Court heard the issue. Id.
78
Id. The Court concluded that the segregation statute separating the races did not
promote the inferiority of African Americans and stated, "If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it." Id. at 551.
79
Id. at 549-51.
so
Id. at 537. The Court cited to Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850), a
decision in the 1850s which allowed school segregation. Id. at 544. The Court also cited to
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This reliance led to the precept that the intent and meaning of the Civil
81
War and Reconstruction Amendments were irrelevant.
Although many states endorsed Jim Crow laws before Plessy, the
Supreme Court's approval of the "separate but equal" doctrine
legitimized racism under state law.8 2 Plessy sanctioned the continuing
oppression of black Americans by sanctioning the concept of "separate
but equal" when, in fact, the system in practice was "separate and
unequal." 83 This precept of racial segregation prevailed for the next halfcentury.84
E.

Mhy the Detour? hat Happened to the Duty to Serve?

According to Plessy, separation did not constitute inequality under
the Fourteenth Amendment as long as the facilities and opportunities
were similar.85 The "separate but equal" doctrine helped maneuver fullscale segregation. 86 Legislatures in the South passed a variety of statutes
as a result of Plessy.8 7 These statutes, designed to keep black Americans

West Chester & PhiladelphiaRailroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867), in which the court used
racial fears and precepts of natural law to justify segregation. Id. at 548. In Miles, the court
stated that "[t]he tendency of intimate social intermixture is to amalgamation, contrary to
the law of races." Miles, 55 Pa. at 213.
81 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 40, at 114. Higginbotham suggests that the Supreme
Court's use of the Miles case, which announced that "God has made" African Americans
"dissimilar," further supported that the Civil War Amendments were futile. Id.
82
Id. at 117. Higginbotham characterizes the opinion in Plessy as the "final and most
devastating judicial step in legitimization of racism under state law." Id.
83

Id. at 117-18 (citing ANTHONY LEWIS, THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES, PORTRAIT OF

A DECADE 17 (1965)). Lewis notes that the "equality" part of the "separate but equal"
doctrine was being ignored. Id. Segregated public facilities became increasingly unequal,
and the blacks became more and more disadvantaged. Id.; see id. at 117 (citing DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 452 (1973)). For example, in South Carolina
in 1915, schools were paying an average of $23.76 on the education of a white student,
compared to $2.91 spent on black students in the segregated schools. Id.
84 Id. at 118.
85
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548 (stating that "enforced separation of the races ... neither
abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property
without due process of the law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws").
86 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 661. Since, according to the Supreme Court,
separation of the races did not constitute inequality under the Fourteenth Amendment, as
long as facilities were somewhat similar, the Equal Protection Clause permitted this
separation. Id.
87 Laws of Tennessee, 1901, Ch. 7, House Bill No. 7, at 9, reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 315. For example, Tennessee's Jim Crow Law in
education is typical legislation enacted throughout the South. The law prohibited Negroes
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segregated, affected "transportation, schools, hospitals, parks, public rest
rooms and water fountains, libraries, cemetaries, recreational facilities,
hotels, restaurants, and almost every other public and commercial
88
facility."
After the Plessy decision, most American state courts interpreted the
Constitution to allow racial discrimination. 89 During the first half of the
twentieth century, the "separate but equal" doctrine dictated race law as
the states continued to pass and enforce discriminatory laws guarded
from legal consequences. 90 During this era, the laissez-faire ideology
emerged as industry progressed, as did the classical legal thought that
brought with it the expansive protections for freedom of contract and
private property rights. 91
The Jim Crow era narrowed the common law duty to serve, with
courts finding valid substantial regulations regarding property that were
specifically designed to promote segregation. 92 Although it appears to

and whites from being educated in the same classrooms and also forbade their attending
the same schools. Id.
88 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 661-62.
89
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Similarities
and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479,495 n.49 (1990).
9
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 662. Courts in the South began to pass laws to
keep whites segregated from blacks in transportation, places like schools, hospitals, parks,
public rest rooms, water fountains, libraries, recreational facilities, and almost every other
public and commercial facility. Id.
91
Singer, supra note 26, at 1395. Singer also notes that
The post-Civil War era, which saw increasing protections for property
rights as well as a narrowing of the duty to serve, was also the Jim
Crow era when the courts found valid substantial regulations of
property designed to promote racial segregation. Although the
narrowing of public accommodation law appears, on the surface, to
cohere with emerging protections for property owners, the
inconsistency between property rights as conceived in this period and
Jim Crow statutes suggests that changes in public accommodations
law are far more tied to racial politics than to lassiez-faire philosophy or
the protection of property from government regulation.
Id.
92
Id. For example, in Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., a coffee merchant was entitled to refuse to
serve black customers at a food show despite a state civil rights act that prohibited racial
discrimination in restaurants, eating houses, lunch counters, and where other refreshments
were served. 123 N.W. 231, 233 (Iowa 1909). The court ruled that the statute only intended
to regulate places that had always been considered quasi-public. Id. The court further
stated that "[ilt is the right of a trader whose business is purely of private character to trade
with whom he will, and he may discriminate as he pleases." Id. The Supreme Court also
contributed to the narrowing of public accommodation law with its decision in Hall v.
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follow the emergence of protectionist notions among property interests,
the narrowing of the public accommodation laws were tied more to
racial politics than to a laissez-faire philosophy or the protection of
property from government interference. 93 No longer did the duty to
serve fit into the emerging theory of property or contract law, which now
purported that owners are free to use their property as they saw fit
rather than owing an obligation to serve. 94 Under the guise of freedom
of choice and new notions of property rights, discrimination by race was
commonplace and the duty to serve no longer was evident. 95
The change in legal precepts revolved around the blurred
distinctions between civil, political, and social rights.96 Black Americans
knew none of their rights in these capacities, since civil rights were those
exercised by a white person, such as the right to property and to enter
into contracts and the ability to bring suit to defend those rights. 97 These
rights were arguably denied because white Americans feared these
forms of associations would "obliterate status distinctions" that had
previously helped suppress African Americans. 98 White Americans
grappled with the idea that equality in public accommodations was a

Decuir. 95 U.S. 485 (1877). The Court struck down Louisiana's 1869 public accommodation
law because of its alleged burden on interstate commerce. Id. Because of the discrepancies
between neighboring states' public accommodation laws, the Chief Justice conceded that
the statute "purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State." Id. at 489.
Because across one state line, both whites and Negroes were allowed to occupy the same
cabin, as opposed to a different state where they could not, the Court felt that the statute
burdened interstate commerce and repealed the statute. Id.
93 Singer, supra note 26, at 1396. Singer notes that the combined effect of Plessy, along
with the states' practices of striking down their own public accommodation statutes,
"opened the way for changes in state law to abolish or limit the duty to serve and replace it
with a rule giving businesses freedom to choose their customers." Id. at 1401 (emphasis
added).
94 Id. at 1402.
95 Kirsten L. McCaw, Freedom of Contract Versus the AntidiscriminationPrinciple: A Critical
Look at the Tension Between Contractual Freedom and Antidiscrimination Provisions, 7 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 195, 202 (1996). McCaw notes that the anti-discrimination principle on its
face actually conflicts with the traditional right of freedom to contract. Id. "Antidiscrimination laws prohibit freedom of choice when that freedom is exercised in a manner
which discriminates against persons on the basis of impermissible criteria." Id. at 202-03.
96 Reva Siegel, Mhy Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1997). It was understood that economic
rights were those exercised by economic men, such as those able to own property, enter into
contracts, and vote-all of which did not realistically include the black man during this era.
Id.
97

Id.

98

d.
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civil right, especially when questions of the social rights of blacks
99
threatened the status of relations that were forged in the past century.
Thus, the notion that citizens had a right to discriminate against the
customers they would serve materialized, and the precept that law
neither could, nor should, enforce social equality among the races
emerged as a legal commonplace. 100
F. The Light at the End of the Tunnel: Brown v. Board of Education and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964
By the late 1940s, a movement to challenge racial discrimination had
emerged, partly because of the experiences from World War 11.101 Strict
separation of the soldiers was reduced, and, at home, workers of both
races labored to support the war effort. 10 2 When World War II was over,
many black soldiers returned with hopes of a better life for themselves
and their families. 10 3 In this changing political environment, the

Id. at 1124. Courts rationalized segregation by invoking a social rights discourse,
finding that segregation was necessary to preserve the status relations of inequality that
originated in slavery. Id. Siegel quotes a decision regarding interpretation of The Civil
Rights Act of 1875:
The colored men were formerly slaves, and the condition of servitude
rendered them greatly wanting in education, refinement and social
nature. White men often came into contact with colored men, but the
association was that of superiors and inferiors. Before the war, white
men who associated with colored men on terms of social equality
These social
became degraded in the eyes of the community.
prejudices are too deeply implanted to be eradicated by any
legislation.
Id. (quoting Charge to the Jury-The Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999, 1001 (C.C.W.D.N.C.
1875)).
100 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 489 (2000). Both the Civil Rights
Cases and Plessy drew on the concepts of freedom of association. Id. The decisions handed
down in both cases were founded on the idea that the Constitution bestowed on former
slaves equality in civil but not social rights. Id. However, as Post and Siegel note,
according to this notion, the law was unable to enforce nor should enforce social equality
among the races. Id. "The commitment to provide emancipated slaves equality at law was
thus bounded by a competing commitment to protect the freedom of 'all' Americans to
discriminate in the choice of their associates." Id. at 489-90.
101 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 662. From the approval and support of Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman, strict separation of the armed forces was reduced, and black and
white men fought together on the battlefields. Id.
102 Id. Many African Americans joined the war effort on the home front by working
together to produce arms and supplies for the troops abroad. Id.
103 Id. It is suggested that since African Americans were able to serve with white men
and women, bringing to light the unfound principles behind racial inequality, both races
would question more and more the wisdom of segregation and promote racial equality. Id.
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Supreme Court was called to reevaluate the "separate but equal"
doctrine. 10 4 In Brown v. Board of Education,05 official racial segregation
was challenged in schools. 10 6 The Court found there was no place for the
doctrine of "separate but equal" and held that "any language in Plessy v.
107
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected."
After invalidating the "separate but equal" doctrine under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 08 the Supreme Court regularly confronted
questions of racial discrimination. 109 The response to Brown and the

Id.
105 347 U.S. 483 (1952).
106 Id. at 487. Linda Brown was an eight-year old black girl who lived in a predominantly
104

white neighborhood only a short distance from the local elementary school in Topeka,
Kansas. The Supreme Court Historical Society, History of the Court; the Vinson Court-19461953, at http://www.supreme courthistory.org/02_history/subs.history/02_c13.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2003). The Board of Education required its elementary schools to be racially
divided, yet the Browns did not want their daughter to go to the school reserved for blacks.
Id. They filed suit, challenging the segregated school system as violating their daughter's
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Brown
appeal was eventually joined by those of four other suits argued in December of 1952. Id.
107 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
108 Id. at 495. The Court looked to the reasoning of the lower court which stated:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro [sic]
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of negro [sic]
children to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in
a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id. at 494 (alteration in original). The Court concluded that the "separate but equal"
doctrine had no place in the field of education and that the segregation deprived the
plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
495.
109 EPsTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 672. Since the decision handed down in Brown
had declared unconstitutional the laws of twenty-one states and the District of Columbia,
which all permitted racial segregation in the schools, action was demanded to comply with
the decision. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 453. Many states

complied, but many forestalled or ignored federal court action. Id. For example, in
Arkansas, there was violence in response to the nine black children who were scheduled
for admission to a Little Rock high school. Id. National Guardsmen were ordered on the
premises by Arkansas Governor Orval Fabus to forestall the plan. Id. President
Eisenhower responded by issuing an Executive Order authorizing the use of federal troops
to ensure the court orders. Id. Soldiers stood at the front of the building to protect the nine
students as they entered the school. Id. at 454. The school board petitioned for a delay in
its desegregation program, but in a special session by the Supreme Court, the delay was
denied by a unanimous decision. Id.; see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (denying the
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demands of a social movement for civil rights made evident the reality
that change would not come voluntarily. 110 During the two decades after
Brown, a wide range of proposals to aid the enforcement of the decision
was offered by civil rights organizations and their supporters."'
However, Brown failed to significantly change the segregation doctrine
until Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.112
Since the Supreme Court lacked the formal enforcement powers to
gain public acceptance of its ruling in Brown, a wave of protests and a
plethora of lobbying occurred in the aftermath to provoke social
change." 3 Powerful advocates began to press for equal rights for black
Americans. 114 In his famous speech, "I Have A Dream," the champion of
civil rights for black Americans and respected advocate, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., called for equal access to places to which whites are
afforded access." 5 Politicians, as well as many Americans, took notice of

claim that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders rested on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution).
110 CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supranote 21, at 453-54.
il
Gary Orfield, The 1964 Civil Rights Act and American Education, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 91 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). The first proposal empowered the
Attorney General to enter civil rights litigation on behalf of the federal government and to
cut off federal funding from those who discriminated in defiance of the constitutional
requirements. Id. This idea was part of Eisenhower's civil rights bill that was eventually
defeated in 1957 for lack of support. Id. A second proposal by the NAACP urged federal
aid to be given only to those educational systems complying with the requirements. Id.
Because it was deemed radical even by congressional liberals, this bill found little support
as well. Id.
112 Id. Many schools remained segregated a decade later, mainly because the Supreme
Court did not create a set of principles capable of desegregating schools. Id. The Brown
decision failed to change schools until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enforced. Id.
113 Randall Kennedy, The Struggle for Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, in LEGACIES
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, supra note 111, at 156; see CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN
NEGRO, supra note 21, at 477. Four college students who decided to sit in at a segregated
lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, started the phenomenon of mass nonviolent
protest. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 447. This tactic
launched mass demonstration and rallies throughout the South in the early 1960s. Id. Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. coordinated a campaign to attack segregation by the use of sit-ins,
picketing, demonstrations, and rallies in Birmingham in April of 1963. Id. at 501. King
defied a judge's injunction that banned Negro protest marches, and the world watched as
the city responded with mass arrests and the use of police dogs, nightsticks, and highpressure fire hoses. Id.
114 Kennedy, supra note 113, at 156.
115 Id. at 157-58.
It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note
insofar as her citizens of color are concerned ....
We can never be
satisfied as long as our bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot
gain lodging in the motels of the highways and the hotels of the cities
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this plea, and legislators proposed federal legislation outlawing racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation." 6 The proposed
legislation was challenged by legislators who were committed to oldfashioned white supremacy, those who feared it would prompt
overreaching and impingement on private entrepreneurs, and others
who questioned its constitutionality. 117 Despite many qualms, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed into law." 8 Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act provided that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation."" 9
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the farthest reaching civil rights
legislation since Reconstruction and was designed to erase racial

.... We can never be satisfied as long as our children are stripped of
their selfhood and robbed of their dignity by signs stating: "For
Whites Only."
Id. at 158 (citing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "I Have a Dream" speech of August 28, 1963).
116
President John F. Kennedy, Address to the Nation (June 11, 1963), in CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 21, at 486. For example, President Kennedy, in light of
the multiple injustices suffered by those who attempted to desegregate schools, addressed
the nation as to the status of African Americans on June 11, 1963:
This nation was founded by men of many nations and back-grounds.
It was founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that
rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are
threatened ....
... We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as clear as the
American Constitution. The heart of the question is whether all
Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities;
whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be
treated.
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a
restaurant open to the public; if he cannot send his children to the best
public school available; if he cannot vote for the public officials who
represent him; if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which
all of us want, then who among us would be content to have the color
of his skin changed and stand in his place?
... I am, therefore, asking the Congress to enact legislation giving
all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the
public-hotels, restaurants and theaters, retail stores and similar
establishments. This seems to me to be an elementary right ....
Id. at 484-87.
117
Kennedy, supra note 113, at 158.
118
EPsTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 655. For example, the Act was passed after the
longest debate in Senate history, lasting eighty-three days. Id. Cloture was invoked for the
first time to cut off the filibuster. Id.
119 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
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discrimination.120 The Act outlawed arbitrary discrimination in voter
registration, authorized the government to bring suits to desegregate
public facilities and schools, extended the Civil Rights Commission,
provided for the withholding of federal funds as a sanction of racial
discrimination, established the right of equality in employment
opportunities, and established a Community Relations Service to help
resolve civil rights problems. 121 The most important provision, in
reference to the issue of discrimination in common carriers, is Title II,
which bars discrimination in places of public accommodation. 122

120 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 655. The law regulated discrimination in
employment, education, and public accommodations. Id. The law fostered regulations on
appropriations and promoted programs that would end discrimination. Id. It outlawed
discrimination not only on race, but also on national origin, religion, and sex discrimination
in employment. Id.
121 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; see also EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 21, at 655.
122 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(c). The full text of these subsections provide:
(a) Equal Access
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodation
of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section,
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin.
(b) Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their
activities by State action as places of public accommodations; lodgings;
facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other
covered establishments
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a
place of public accommodations within the meaning of this subchapter
if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation is
supported by State action:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within
a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire
and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment
in his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for the
consumption on the premises, including but not limited to, any such
facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any
gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena,
stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or
(ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such
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One of the underlying reasons to pass civil rights legislation to
prohibit discrimination in places of public accommodation was the idea
of economic strength.123 In the congressional hearings regarding the Act,
the idea that a market filled with racial discrimination places undue
burdens on commerce was used to support the passage of the Act. 124

covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving
patrons of such covered establishment.
(c) Operations affecting commerce; criteria; "commerce" defined
The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the
meaning of this subchapter if (1) it is one of the establishments
described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of this section; (2) in the
case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of
this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a
substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other
products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an
establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this
section, it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in
commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in
paragraph (4) of subsection (b) of this section, it is physically located
within the premises of, or there is physically located within its
premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce
within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section,
"commerce" means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, or between the District of
Columbia and any State, or between any foreign country or any
territory or possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or
between points in the same State but through any other State or the
District of Columbia or a foreign country.
Id.
123

BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS:

RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 33 (1997) ("Just as unity may require a moral consensus as to what
business practices are permissible, so also the free flow of commerce may be impeded if
some businesses are allowed to discriminate while their competitors are not."); see also H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (stating that "our economic unit is
the Nation").
124 LANDSBERG, supranote 123, at 33. Landsberg cites to President Kennedy's message to
Congress made in 1963 in which he noted, "An end to racial and religious discriminationwhich not only affronts our basic ideals but burdens our economy with waste-offers an
imperative contribution to growth." Id.; see also H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. (1963), H.R. Rep. No.
914, (1963), S. 1732, 88th Cong. (1964), S. Rep. No. 872 (1964) (discussing the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Kennedy, supra note 113, at 159. Kennedy purports that
the success of Title II can be attributed to the fact that it attacked a simpler and more
vulnerable target. Kennedy, supra note 111, at 161. Title II freed white entrepreneurs in the
South to sell their goods and services to a larger clientele without fear of retaliation. Id.
Kennedy also suggests economic forces helped in desegregation efforts, stating that Title II
"gave them cover to do what market forces would have prompted them to do anyway,
absent the emotional factor of racial prejudice." Id. at 162.
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The legality of Title II was challenged immediately by the owner of
the Heart of Atlanta Hotel who alleged that Congress had no authority
to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. 2
Although eight justices agreed with the opinion of the Court, two
showed reluctance in basing the decision solely on the powers of the
Commerce Clause. 126 The concurring justices believed that the Court
should have based the decision on the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure
Americans the right to be treated as equal members of the community
with respect to public accommodations and to put an end to all
obstructionist strategies to "finally close one door on a bitter chapter in
American history." 1 27 The Court instead chose to uphold the Act based
on the Commerce Clause and left the choice to pursue other methods of
eliminating discrimination as a matter of policy that rests with Congress
and not with the courts. 12
Although the passage of the Act, as well as the decision in Heart of
Atlanta v. United States,129 resembled victory for advocates of equal rights,
the Act quickly faded in significance as a deterrent to racial

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The appellant
contended that the prohibition of racial discrimination exceeded Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause and violated other parts of the Constitution. Id. The appellant also
relied on the Court's holding in the Civil Rights Cases. Id.
Id. at 279. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas opined:
126
My reluctance is not due to any conviction that Congress lacks power
to regulate commerce in the interests of human rights. It is rather my
belief that the right of people to be free of state action that
discriminates against them because of race, like the "right of persons to
move freely from State to State" "occupies a more protected position in
our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel,
and coal across state lines."
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In citing a Senate report regarding the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, Justice Goldberg stated:
Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and
movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a
person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a
member of the public because of his race or color. It is equally the
inability to explain to a child that regardless of education, civility,
courtesy, and morality he will be denied the right to enjoy equal
treatment, even though he be a citizen of the United States and may
well be called upon to lay down his life to assure this Nation
continues.
Id. at 292 (Golberg, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. No. 872, at 16 (1964)).
127
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 280.
12
Id.at 261.
Id.
129
125
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discrimination since its foundation rested not on equal rights for all but
instead on removing obstructions to commerce. 130 Since courts were
reluctant to interpret the Act as securing racial equality, and because
Congress has not revisited this specific issue since the decision in Heart of
Atlanta, what is left is an ambiguous idea of how far Title II reaches in
terms of prohibiting racial discrimination in certain places of public
In terms of litigating complaints of taxicab
accommodation.
discrimination, it may leave questions as to whether an argument
advancing the common law duty to serve without unjust discrimination
can measure up when backed by a policy grounded not on racial
equality but the ability to move freely without obstruction of commerce.
III. WHAT'S UNDER THE HOOD?
TAXICAB LITIGATION AND SOURCES OF RACISM

In order to lay a foundation regarding the complexities of the
litigation of taxicab discrimination, it is
problems surrounding
important to discuss the possible motivation behind this behavior. By
discussing the complexity of the tenets behind racial discrimination in
taxicab service, it may impart some explanation as to why many modem
public accommodation statutes and policies are ambiguous or even
nonexistent.
A. Policing the Cabbies: Litigationof Race Discriminationby Cab Drivers
Litigation of taxicab discrimination is often costly and time
consuming, limiting victims' ability to file a claim. 131 These combined
factors are often coupled with the perception of "powerlessness" that
black Americans experience as a result of racial discrimination
encountered on a daily basis.1 32 In a search of federal and state opinions

Id. at 241; see Kennedy, supra note 113, at 159. Although the statute prohibits racial
discrimination in public accommodations, it only lists a minimal number of places where
discrimination is outlawed. Kennedy, supra note 113, at 160. Not only was litigation to
enforce the Act expensive, but because of its ambiguity, decisions as to whether the statute
was inclusive or exhaustive was a question many courts were reluctant to grapple with. Id.
at 160-61.
131
Loren Page Ambinder, Dispelling the Myth of Rationality: Racial Discrimination in
Taxicab Service and the Efficacy of Litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 342,
347 (1996).
130

132

Id.
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regarding public accommodations, a small number actually exist, despite
133
the fact that discrimination occurs on a daily basis.
Bringing suit under public accommodation laws can be effective, but
public accommodation laws are often interpreted by courts as statutes
which are intended to afford remedies to large classes of people, thus
limiting their application when pertaining to individual claims. 134 A
potential litigant may also attempt to bring a common carrier tort
action.135 Success in a common carrier tort action may be difficult since
the litigant must persuade the factfinder that the wrong suffered was
more than "a minor insolence." 136 In light of these limits, most common
carrier litigation is brought under § 1981, whose origination is not rooted
in modem civil rights legislation but instead found in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.137
Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons ... shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens." 138 Some courts have applied § 1981 in a way

133 Peter Siegelman, Racial Discriminationin "Everyday" Commercial Transactions: What Do
We Know, Wat Do We Need to Know, and How Can We Find Out?, in THE URBAN INSTITUTE, A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 82 (1998). Siegelman notes that,
"[alithough there have been tens of thousands of federal employment discrimination cases
filed since 1990, and several thousands of opinions written, ... [the] search turned up a
mere 23 opinions in public accommodation cases in both state and federal courts." Id.
134 BELL, JR., supra note 83, at 128-29.
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965). Section 48 of the Americal Legal
Institute ("ALl") Restatement (Seconds) of Torts states that "[a] common carrier or other
public utility is subject to liability to patrons utilizing its facilities for gross insults which
reasonably offend them, inflicted by the utility's servants while otherwise acting within the
scope of their employment." Id.
136 Id. § 48(c). Section 48(c) notes that "[t]he rule of this Section does not extend to mere
trivialities. Even at the hands of public servants, the public must be expected and required
to be hardened to a certain amount of rudeness or minor insolence, which any reasonable
man would consider offensive but harmless and unimportant." Id.
137 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 348.
138 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2002).
§1981. Equal rights under the law
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
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that may convert it into a public accommodation law.1 39 Section 1981
governs not only governmental actors but also nongovernmental actors
who refuse to enter business transactions because of race.1 40 While this
section seemed promising in litigating racial discrimination regarding
public accommodations, its effect may be disappointing considering
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Runyon v. McCrary.141 Powell's
idea that certain personal relationships, whose contractual decisions are
racially motivated, may in fact be outside the scope of § 1981.142 Powell's
suggestion has arguably narrowed the statute, offering the idea that
1 43
there are certain contracts which are just too personal to enforce.
Many instances of taxicab discrimination occur when a minority
passenger is passed up, usually so that a white passenger may be picked
up, or is refused service to a minority neighborhood. In order for a
minority American to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
by a taxicab driver under § 1981, one must show the following: (1) the
plaintiff is a minority; (2) the plaintiff presented himself or herself
properly on a public thoroughfare frequented by taxicabs; (3) the
plaintiff attempted to hail a cab; and (4) the vehicle passed the plaintiff
and picked up a white passenger, or a taxicab stopped for a plaintiff and

139 Singer, supra note 26, at 1425; see Perry v. Command Performance, 913 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.
1990) (using § 1981 in a case where a beauty parlor refused to serve an African American
customer); Floyd-Mayers v. Am. Cab Co., 732 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1990) (using § 1981 in a
case where a taxi driver passed up a black customer to serve a white customer instead).
140 See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436-37 (1968) (holding that
§ 1981 and § 1982 apply to acts of private discrimination); see Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973) (acknowledging that the language of § 1981 is
traceable to the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, therefore, there was no
reason to construe its applicability to private actors differently).
141 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (prohibiting a racially motivated refusal by a private school to
contract with a black student).
142 Id. at 187.
143 Id. Justice Powell stated in his concurring opinion:
In certain personal contractual relationships, ... such as those where
the offeror selects those with whom he desires to bargain on a
individualized basis, or where the contract is the foundation of a close
association, ... there is no reason to assume, that although the choice
made by the offeror is selective, it reflects a 'purpose of exclusiveness'
other than the desire to bar members of the Negro race. Thus,
although section 1981 encompasses racial discrimination committed by
private actors, personal contracts involving a few individuals who are
chosen on a particular basis, as opposed to a first come, first serve
basis, may not fall within the statute's scope.
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then refused to drive the plaintiff to a certain location in the city. 44 In
the latter situation, the litigants would have to show that the driver
refused to take them to a certain location because of their race or because
145
the neighborhood has primarily minority residents.
The difficulty in proving the required factors in a case of taxicab
discrimination may limit a victim of taxicab discrimination from
bringing suit.146 One reason is that the driver and passenger tend to have
"transitory" contact, making the determination of racially motivated
behavior difficult. 147 This causes problems in discerning whether the
taxicab driver intended to discriminate on the basis of race-an element
that is often imperative in successful taxicab discrimination cases. 148
B.

Why I Can't Get a Cab: Motivation Behind Taxicab Discrimination

Proving an actual case of taxicab discrimination may further be
complicated by the rationalization often afforded to instances of racial
discrimination. Americans have a common cultural and historical
heritage in which racism has been constant and influential in regard to
beliefs and ideas about minorities. 149
A large part of racial
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation. 150 The

144 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 355; see also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (discussing who bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case
of disparate treatment in employment discrimination). Ambinder applies the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine framework established in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
in the context of litigation of taxicab discrimination. Ambinder, supra note 131, at 355. See
also Nicoletti v. NYC Taxi & Limousine Com'n, 1999 WL 349949 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1999)
(unpublished opinion); Bolden v. J. & R. Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2001), for examples
of claims of discrimination by taxicab drivers.
145 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 355. Plaintiffs could prove that the driver refused to take
them to a neighborhood because it was predominately black by proving that taxicabs were
not servicing the area because of race discrimination. Id.
146

Id. at 347.

147 Id. Ambinder points out that often no verbal conversation takes places when a cab
purposely passes by an individual. Id. Unless a driver picks up a white customer instead,
it is difficult for the passenger to assess whether actual racial discrimination is the cause of
the fare refusal. Id.
148 Id.
149 CHARLES LAWRENCE, The ID, the EGO, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 237 (Kimberl Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). "Because of
this shared experience ...[Americans] inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs
that attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions
about nonwhites." Id.
150 Id. at 236. Lawrence suggests that in dealing with discrimination cases, the burden of
persuasion is on the wrong side of the dispute. Id. "Improper motives are easy to hide.
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idea of unconscious racism is usually transformed through the tacitly
transmitted cultural stereotype.1 51 It may be difficult to identify a
morally culpable person who has consciously discriminated on the basis
of race since most people are unaware of their actions.15 2 For example,
when the cab drivers in New York refused to pick up Danny Glover,
they perceived him not as an Oscar-winning actor, but as a potential risk
as a minority fare-holder who had a greater potential to mug or steal
153
from the driver.
Motives behind racial discrimination by common carriers can be
discussed by using different theories that evolve from many different
facets of moral, social, and economic policy.lM4 One such theory is that a
particular group is treated differently because the group is disliked or
hated by other groups. 155 Conventional reasoning suggests, however,
that minority cab drivers would not purposely discriminate against other
minorities because it would go against their own beliefs.15 6 This
argument may be too simplistic, particularly in the common carrier
context, since most cab drivers are not just black Americans, but also
3 57
ethnic immigrants who may not identify with other racial stereotypes

And because behavior results from the interaction of a multitude of motives, [one may] ...
always be able to argue that racially neutral considerations promoted their actions." Id.
151 Id. at 241; see infra note 153 and accompanying text.
152 LAWRENCE, supra note 149, at 241. A person is unaware that his actions, or what he
thinks is a racially neutral feeling, has a racist origin. Id.
153 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 367; Bumiller, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 2; see
LAWRENCE, supra note 149, at 241. Lawrence's explanation of unconscious racism could
give some insight into why a cab driver would pass up Danny Glover on the street:
A crucial factor in the process that produces unconscious racism is the
tacitly transmitted cultural stereotype. If an individual has never
known a black doctor or lawyer or is exposed to blacks only through
mass media where they are portrayed in the stereotypical roles of
comedian, criminal, musician, or athlete, he is likely to deduce that
blacks as a group are naturally inclined toward certain behavior and
unfit for certain roles.
Id. LAWRENCE, supra note 149, at 241.
154 See generally LAWRENCE, supra note 149, at 235-36 (giving examples of different types
of motivation behind discriminatory behavior).
'55
Ambinder, supra note 131, at 364 (citing Professor Gary Becker, calling this theory
"taste discrimination" or "animus-based discrimination").
156

Id.

157 Id. at 365. Immigrants make up at least ninety percent of New York City driver
applicants. Id.; see Sheryl Fragin, Taxi!, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1994, at 30. Chicago and
Washington, D.C., also have a predominantly immigrant taxicab force. Id. at 31.
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Another theory involving a rationalization of racial discrimination is
based on risk assessment by many common carriers. 158 Under this
theory, minority groups will be treated differently based on an
assumption that they pose a greater risk than other groups. 159 For
example, in the taxicab context, drivers may fear greater danger of injury
when they pick up a minority fare or have to serve a minority
neighborhood that is known for its high crime statistics. 160 Drivers may
decide whom to pick up based on generalized ideas or their own
experiences with passengers. 161 However, this poses a fundamental
problem since there is a tendency, especially when dealing with race, to
rationalize this behavior because of flawed and inaccurate
162
representations of minorities.

158 Courtland Milloy, For Cabbies, Judging Fares Isn't Simple, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2000, at
B1 (discussing the risks of picking up passengers or refusing the fare outright). For
example, Thomas Redmond with the Madison Cab Association in Washington, D.C.,
stated, "It's a tricky situation ... [o]n one hand, you're talking about my losing my license,
which is my livelihood; on the other hand, you're talking about losing my life." Id.
159 LAWRENCE, supra note 149, at 247. Lawrence states:

The unconscious racial attitudes of individuals manifest themselves in
the cultural meaning that society gives their actions in the following
way: In a society that no longer condones overt racist attitudes and
behavior, many of the attitudes will be repressed and prevented from
reaching awareness in an undisguised form. But as psychologists have
found, repressed wishes, fears, anger, and aggression continue to seek
expression, most often by attaching themselves to certain symbols in
the external world.
Id. Hence, discrimination will attach itself to those symbols that society itself has projected
as fearful, like the black male. Id.
160 Milloy, supra note 158; see James Hill & Sarah Downey, Taxis Still Can Be Rare Despite
Law, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1998, at C1. The Chicago City Council passed a taxicab law that
required taxis to serve areas usually shunned by fearful or money-motivated drivers. Id.
Cabbies complained that the ordinance would force them to drive in bad areas where they
risk harm and also in which they cannot make money. Id.; see also CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL
CODE § 9-112-450 (1997).

161 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 368.
According to the risk-based theory of discrimination, drivers may
decide who to pick up based on publicized crime statistics and their
own generalized experiences with passengers....
A fundamental
problem with accepting such behavior is the tendency, particularly in
the context of race, for the statistics to be subjectively flawed and
inaccurate.
Id.
162 LAWRENCE, supra note 149, at 236; see Jeff Jacoby, Is It Racism or Is It Fear? BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 18, 1999, at A27. Jacoby reports that, according to a 1994 report by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, the occupation of cab driver accounted for one-tenth of all victims of
job-related homicides. Jacoby, supra. Trips to secluded areas, especially at night, makes the
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In Washington, D.C., Taxicab Commissioner Sandra Seegers gave a
general warning to urge cabbies to pass up "dangerous looking people"
and to stay out of "dangerous neighborhoods" after the murder of a
taxicab driver. 163 Seegers stated that a dangerous looking person would
be "a young black guy ...with his hat on backwards, shirttail hanging
down longer than his coat, baggy pants down below his underwear and
unlaced tennis shoes. That's the look." 164 Seegers' interpretation of a
"dangerous looking person" caused an uproar as many minority riders
were refused fares due to her warning. 165
The main argument advanced by most common carriers to justify
their refusal of fares or refusal to serve minority neighborhoods is that
they may choose with whom they want to contract. 166 Common carriers
suggest that they should not be forced to accept a fare that will
jeopardize their safety. 167 For example, after a driver was robbed and
carjacked in March of 2000, he sued the city of Chicago for violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment right to personal security, arguing that the
ordinance prohibiting drivers from discriminating against passengers
endangered his life.168 However, a federal judge dismissed the case,
saying it failed to show constitutional grounds to overturn the
ordinance, since it is intended to protect consumers, particularly African

drivers particularly vulnerable; almost half the cabdrivers died from 9:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.
Id.; see also Janice Windau & Guy Toscano, Workplace Homicides in 1992, COMPENSATION
AND WORKING CONDITIONS, Feb. 1994, at 1-8 (reprinted in US DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

STATISTICS REPORT 870, April 1994, Fatal Workplace Injuries in 1992: A Collection of Data and
Analysis) (stating further that "taxicab drivers and chauffeurs face unusually high risks of
becoming homicide victims, with a rate of 43 homicides per 100,000 workers").
163

Milloy, supranote 158.

164

Id.

165 Id. As Seegers sees it, "a small group of uncouth blacks is giving all blacks a bad
name, and either that group cleans up its act or else they'll be singled out for punishment
while the rest of us will just have to tolerate a certain amount of inadvertent
discrimination." Id.
166 Tom McCann, Cabbie Sues City, Blames Carjacking on Mandate Driver Wants Right to
Choose Passengers,CR1. TRIB., May 3,2000, at N3. "I should be allowed to act on my gut
feeling that the person who's flagging me down is only doing it to rob and beat me," said a
Chicago cab driver of seventeen years. Id.
167 Hill & Downey, supra note 160. During the publishing of Hill & Downey's article,
Steve Weidersberg, President of the Chicago Professional Taxi Driver's Association, said he
was tired of drivers, many of them from minority groups, being portrayed as racist and
rude. Id. "Cabbies aren't racist; we drive everywhere. But mama raised two sons and no
dummies .... You do whatever it takes to watch your back, if you don't you become a
statistic." Id.
168

McCann, supranote 166.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2003], Art. 5

960

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

Americans and Hispanics, who have complained about the taxi
169
service.
Many cabbies suggest that refusing fares to underserved
neighborhoods has a viable economic justification. 170 Often times,
cabbies are not able to pick up return fares after traveling to an
underserved destination.' 7' Thus, requiring drivers to take a fare to an
underserved neighborhood may prove burdensome since the driver
could have stayed where there is a greater opportunity to pick up a fare
instead of losing revenue by not returning with a passenger. 72
In addition, it is important to note that cab drivers have a viable
argument, suggesting that taxicab use would be safer and more
profitable for drivers since they reduce risks by not taking chances on
minority fares. 73 Drivers often have to make a gut decision when a
fearful situation arises whether to take the perceived risk or pass up the
fare.174 However, when race is used as a proxy, it could generate errors
and may prove to be inefficient in the long run. 75 Racial discrimination
based on generalized stereotypes discourages minorities from
participating in public activities. 176 For minority citizens, it also calls into
question the legitimacy of a legal and judicial system that asserts an

169 Judge Dismisses Cabbie's Pleas Against Picking Up All Riders, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 2000, at

N3.
170 Sabrina Walters, Cabbies Out as Fourth Roles In, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 4, 2001, at 11.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Marcus Cole, Medallion Monopoly Drives Taxicab Racism, LIBERTY AND LAW (Institute

for Justice, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2000).
174

Id.

175 Stephan C. Fehr, Cab Official Repudiate on Warning; Williams Wants Shields to Protect
D.C. Drivers, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2000, at B1. After the slaying of a driver, the D.C. cab
commissioner told cabbies to stay out of low-income black neighborhoods and to be
cautious of dangerous looking young black men. Id.
176 Furmin D. Sessoms, All Chicagoans Deserve Cab Service, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1998, at N22
(Voice of the People letter). In a Commentary written to the Chicago Tribune, Furmin D.
Sessoms, Executive Director of the Chicago Southside NAACP, stated,
Freedom of movement is essential to a free society, and our
constitutional concepts of personal liberty require that all citizens be
free to travel freely. People should be able to count on taxi service that
does not unreasonably burden or restrict their movement. Taxicab
owners' common illegal practices of discrimination lock people into
neighborhoods and frustrate their aspirations by denying them equal
access to educational opportunities, church, work and associations
enjoyed by others.
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antidiscriminatory purpose, yet often justifies race-based conduct by
taxicab drivers that furthers the stereotype of minorities and African
Americans as criminals. 177
Permitting racial discrimination in common carriers produces great
social and moral costs. 178 The stereotypes may appear to be a rational
interpretation of situations and the surrounding facts but instead are
often "the product of tacitly 'learned cultural preferences."' 179 If these
racist attitudes and behaviors are not condemned, they will be repressed
and prevented from reaching awareness. 180
IV. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE ALIGNMENT? AMBIGUITIES IN PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION LAWS AND WHY THE POLICIES Do NOT WORK

Taxicab discrimination destroys the fullness of the lives of African
Americans, and others who are victims of discriminatory actions, by
disallowing participation in community activities by making them
inaccessible. 181 Taxicab discrimination inflicts psychological harm on the
individuals by rendering black persons invisible and making them feel
like less than full human beings. 82 Many blacks discover that, no matter
how affluent and influential they are, there is little escape from the
stigma of being black.183 It is for these reasons that an examination of

Fehr, supra note 175.
Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 795 (1994) (quoting PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 46 (1991)). Armour purports that "taxicab discrimination
destroys 'the fullness of African Americans' public, participatory selves' and causes blacks
to avoid engaging in integral community activities that take place in locations of the city
which are effectively made inaccessible." Id.
179 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 369.
180 LAWRENCE, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 149, at 247.
181 Armour, supra note 178, at 795 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 178, at 46).
Discrimination forces blacks to avoid ostensibly public places like white neighborhoods,
teller machines, as well as community activities like shopping, sightseeing, or "hanging
out" since their motivations are often mistaken for suspicious behavior. Id.
182 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 344 (quoting a WRC Channel 4, Washington D.C.
Investigative report on Taxicab Discrimination, reported by Pat Muse on November 10-11,
1994, where Muse solicited statements from black victims of taxicab discrimination).
183 Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public
Places, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 111-12 (1991). Feagin gives a vivid example of a black student
who walks home from a campus job in a predominantly white neighborhood. Id. In an
interview, the student stated,
[When I pass,] white men tighten their grip on women. I've seen
people turn around like they're going to take blows from me. The
police constantly make circles around me as I walk home, you know,
177
178
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taxicab discrimination and the failure of public accommodation laws is
long overdue. It is important to look not only at the social policies
surrounding the issue, but also the legal limitations of the unsettled
principles behind Title II, individual state public accommodation
statutes, and municipal policies designed to alleviate the problem.
A. The Traffic Jain: Ambiguities and Their Impact on the Interpretation of
Public Accommodation Laws
Although Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that "[a]ll
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodation of any
place of public accommodation.., without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, or national origin," it fails to give an
exhaustive list of places of public accommodation184 There are many
reasons to explain why Congress chose not to include common carriers
or list other public accommodations, one being that Congress specifically
left out common carriers in the Civil Rights Act because they believed
they should not be included.1 85 Or, it could be argued that Congress
intended for the Act to be read more broadly when deciding what is
included under "public accommodation" and what would obscure
"commerce." 186 Whatever the line of reasoning, an explanation may be
found by comparing the common law definition of duty to serve and the
language of modem state public accommodation statutes with the
187
language and intent of the 1964 Act.

for blocks. I'll walk, and they'll turn a block. And they'll come around
me just to make sure, to find out where I am going. So, every day you
realize [you're black]. Even though you're not doing anything wrong;
you're just existing. You're just a person. But you're a black person
perceived in an unblack world.
Id. (emphasis added).
184 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
185 Singer, supranote 26, at 1415.
186 David B. Filvaroll & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Original Enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in LEGACIES OF THE 1965 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, supra note 111, at 29. The Act's
passage was aided by a spirit of the times. Id. During this time, there was optimism, hope,
and conviction that things could change based on the broad ideology of equal rights. Id.
187 Singer, supra note 26, at 1415. Because of their broader language and issues regarding
public accommodations, current statutes may be useful in filling in the ambiguities found
in the Civil Rights Act. Id.
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One argument is that Congress could have intended for the 1964 Act
to be read in light of the changing common law. 188 The common law rule
in 1964 was that "innkeepers and common carriers ... had duties to
serve the public without unjust discrimination."189 In order to implement
that aspect of the common law rule, the 1964 Act only cited examples of
property that was "separate but equal." 190 In a sense, it may be inferred
that Congress was responding to those establishments that posed the
greatest problem. 191 However, one cannot ignore the fact that there was
great opposition to the Act of 1964, and much of it rested on the rights of
private property owners, suggesting that leaving out common carriers
was necessary for the Act to pass and not indicative of its true purpose to
192
alleviate racial inequality.
At the core of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the section that states
that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
services of "any place of public accommodation." 193 While the statute is
ambiguous in many respects, its purpose is to afford equal access to
businesses that serve the general public. 194 In order to achieve the
purpose of the Act, it could be argued that the courts should interpret
the statute broadly, so as not to defeat its intent. 95 Congress only
mentions certain types of establishments, yet that does not mean
Congress intended for discrimination to continue in other businesses that
serve the public-an activity that would arguably violate its original
purpose. 196

188 Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed,3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
189 Singer, supra note 26, at 1416 (emphasis added).
190 Id. Singer suggests that the only purpose of the 1964 Act was to implement the aspect
of the common law, which suggested a duty to serve, while over-turning the notion that
segregation was a "reasonable regulation of private property open to the public and that
separate facilities were equal." Id.
191 Id. at 1418.
Singer notes that the legislatures were not obliged to solve all the
problems with the signage of one particular act. Id. "There is no obligation on a legislature
to address a problem fully or not at all; it is empowered to address specific aspects of a
problem that are brought to its attention and for which a reasonable compromise or
consensus can be reached among the legislators." Id.
192

Id. at 1417.

193 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
194 See infra note 198 and accompanying text; see also Singer, supra note 26, at 1421.
195 Singer, supra note 26, at 1421.
196 Id. Singer notes that, with the purpose to afford equal access to businesses that serve
the general public, Congress wanted to make "crystal clear" that discrimination was not
allowed in those establishments listed in the Act. Id. However, this did not mean that
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If statutes are to be read in light of the common law, and in order to
evaluate the meaning of the Civil Rights Act today, it may be beneficial
to look at recent statutes related to public accommodations to ascertain
197
the social policy and intent behind the codification of the statutes.
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, passed to prohibit, among
other things, discrimination on the basis of disability in public
accommodations, lists many more places of public accommodation than
are listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.198 The statute does not

Congress would encourage or allow discrimination in other establishments. Id. "[S]uch a
result would violate the policy underlying the entire regulatory scheme." Id.
197 See Llewellyn, supra note 188, at 401.
198 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2000).
§ 12181. Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
(1) Commerce
The term "commerce" means travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication(A) among the several States;
(B) between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any
State; or
(C) between points in the same State but through another State or
foreign country
(2) Commercial facilities
The term "commercial facilities" means facilities(A) that are intended for nonresidential use; and
(B) whose operation will affect commerce
(3) Demand responsive system
The term "demand responsive system" means
transportation of individuals by a vehicle, other
a fixed route system.
(4) Fixed route system
The term "fixed route system" means a
transportation of individuals (other than by
vehicle is operated along a prescribed route
schedule.

any system providing
than a system which is

system of providing
aircraft) on which a
according to a fixed

(7) Public accommodation
The following private entities are considered public accommodations
for purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities effect
commerce (A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an
establishment located within a building that contains not more than
five for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of
such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C). a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other
exhibition or entertainment;
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specifically name "common carriers" or "taxicabs" as public
accommodations, yet it alludes to "specified public transportation"
meaning transportation "by bus, rail, or any other conveyance ...that
provides the general public with general or special service ... on a regular and
continuing basis." 199
This
suggests
that
interpretation
of
antidiscrimination laws should prohibit discrimination in common
carriers, such as taxicabs.
In addition to ambiguities in federal statutes concerning common
carriers, state statutes offer little guidance as well. 2°0
State public
accommodation statutes that list specific places as examples of public
accommodations may cause the determination of what is encompassed
by the statute to be all the more confusing. 201 Some state statutes go so

(D)an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office
of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment,
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate
private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank,
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place
of exercise or recreation.
(10) Specified public transportation
The term "specified public transportation" means transportation by
bus, rail, or any other conveyance (other than by aircraft) that provides
the general public with general or specific service (including charter service)
on a regularand continuing basis.
Id. (emphasis added). This is relevant because the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act
contains a much longer list of "places of public accommodation," suggesting that a broad
interpretation of the 1964 Act could be justified by reference to these contemporary values.
Singer, supra note 26, at 1423.
199 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10) (emphasis added) (discussing the definition of specified places of
public transportation).
200 See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
2M
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101 (West 1993). For example, the Illinois Human
Rights Act defines a place of public accommodation to mean:
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far as to list omnibuses, streetcars, and funeral hearses, but give no
mention to taxicabs. 202 One may ask why a legislature would distinguish
even hearses from other businesses open to the public, rather than those
that are used more commonly, such as taxicabs. Furthermore, it would
be difficult to justify a legislative choice to continue discrimination in
places such as taxicabs, while service establishments are prohibited from
20 3
exercising such action.
On the other end of the spectrum, many state statutes provide an
open, functional definition, rather than listing those places which fall
under a definition of public accommodation. 2° 4 With this in mind, it is

a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or
transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations
are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise available to the public.
(2) By way of example, but not of limitation, "place of public
accommodation" includes facilities of the following types: inns,
restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors,
taverns, roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores,
hat stores, shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks,
public golf courses, public golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle
rinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or rooms, railroads, omnibuses,
busses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral hearses,
crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water, or air,
public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation and
amusement.
Id.
202

Id.

203 Singer, supra note 26, at 1417. Singer notes that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, if read on

its face, would
allow discrimination to continue in barber shops, beauty parlors, many
other service establishments, retail stores, bowling alleys, and other
places of recreation .... It is hard to follow a morality when it allows
one bowling alley to remain segregated, while another bowling alley
down the street which serves sandwiches must allow Negroes to bowl.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10).
204 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1999). California's Civil Rights Act states that
"[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id.; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3 (West
Supp. 1999) (defining "'public accommodation' ... [as] any establishment that caters or
offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public"). The Kansas statute states
that "[plublic accommodations means any person who caters or offers goods, services,
facilities and accommodations to the public," and then goes on to give a nonexhaustive list
of places of public accommodation. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002 (Supp. 1999). Minnesota's
public accommodation statute states that a "[p]lace of public accommodation means a
business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility
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noted that legislation is almost always a compromise of competing
interests, and, in this case, the competing concern is the interest in not
being discriminatorily excluded from the marketplace on the basis of
race, versus property rights and the freedom to contract. 2 5 It could be
argued that statutes are left broad in order to create a fluctuating
interpretation of what is a place of public accommodation so as to
prohibit discrimination in a wide-range of places. 20 6 Inconsistencies in
what constitutes a public accommodation for purposes of the Civil
Rights Act have not only led to confusion in determining what
constitutes a service or place within public accommodation laws, but
20 7
also have produced discrepancies in the actual enforcement of the law.
Some of these discrepancies are evident in current issues facing common
20 8
carriers in many cities today.
Many Americans believe that a core function of the federal
government is to prohibit discrimination in the public and private
sectors. 2° 9 Yet, when the constitutionality of the civil rights laws is based
not on equal protection, but the Commerce Clause, the government
avoids a crucial role it should play in enforcing civil rights. 210 Common
carriers assert that anti-discrimination laws interfere with their freedom
to contract. 211 What is overlooked is the idea that contractual freedom
does not hold the same footing as imperative equality since § 1981 and

of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to
the public." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West Supp. 1999). North Dakota regards public
accommodations to mean "every place, establishment, or facility, of whatever kind, nature,
or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee,
charge, or gratuity." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02 (1997). Cf. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/501.
205 Singer, supra note 26, at 1417.
206 Llewellyn, supra note 188, at 401.
LANDSBERG, supra note 123, at 42.
208 See infra Part IV.B for examples of current issues facing taxi drivers and taxi
207

consumers.
209 Post & Siegel, supra note 100, at 502. The authors suggest that, because of the fervent
and highly publicized debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, many Americans'
beliefs of the role of the federal government changed, including its function to prohibit
racial discrimination. Id.
210 Id. In Supreme Court decisions, the Court, "in contrast to its treatment of the
Commerce Clause power, offers no positive account of the appropriate relationship
between the federal and state governments in matters of civil rights enforcement." Id.
211 Cole, supra note 1. "Rather than pick up customers because of the desire for
additional business, or enter underserved neighborhoods to circumvent competition, these
monopolists are empowered to pick and choose their customers." Id.
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Title II explicitly limit the freedom to contract. 212 Although the
narrowing of § 1981 by the ideas advanced in the concurring opinion in
Runyon seem to support most cabbies' contention that refusal of fares is a
right not to be relinquished, those who control the enforcement of
regulations pertaining to cab drivers have devised different methods to
convalesce this issue. 213 What is advanced as the fundamental issue in
the taxicab context is not the freedom of contract or the legislating of
morals, but instead it is the attainment of equal access to public
accommodations.
B.

Trouble Starting the Cab: Difficulty in Litigation

Along with the ambiguities and inconsistencies found in public
accommodation statutes, overreaching municipal policies add to the
complexity of issues concerning taxicab service. Often, interests of
taxicab drivers regarding their safety and financial restraints are not
addressed. 214 The distinction between decisions to refuse fares based on
economic concerns or safety issues are often blurred with what are actual
incidents of taxicab discrimination.215 Not only is litigation expensive
and overwhelming for the consumer, the unclear distinction between
racially motivated behavior and contractual decision-making in the
taxicab context has made combating taxicab or common carrier
216
discrimination an even more daunting task.
Because of the difficulty in proving cases of racial discrimination by
taxicab drivers and the abundance of complaints received regarding fare
refusal and limited service, cities such as Chicago and New York City
have taken two different approaches to alleviate the problem. 217 Near
the end of 1997, Chicago passed an ordinance which prohibited the
218
refusal of fares to neighborhoods the drivers felt were too dangerous.

212 Bernard Grofman, Civil Rights, the Constitution, Common Decency, and Common Sense, in
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, supra note 111, at 220. Civil rights policy lost sight
of its original goal of ending discrimination and requiring race-neutral treatment. Id.
213 See infra notes 217-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of municipal policies
designed to alleviate taxicab discrimination.
214 Dan Ackman, City Work; Yellow Cab Drivers Get No Relief NEWSDAY, Mar. 21, 2001, at
A38.
215

Id.

216 Ambinder, supra note 131, at 347.
217 See infra notes 218-36 and accompanying text for a description of the two different
approaches Chicago and New York City have devised to alleviate taxicab discrimination.
218 CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9-112-450 (1997).

This section makes it "unlawful to

refuse any person transportation to any place within the city ... in any taxicab unoccupied
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Two years later, lack of taxi service was still a reported problem in many
city neighborhoods.21 9 The issue was thrust into city news when a cab
driver sued the city, arguing that the ordinance prohibiting drivers from
discriminating against passengers endangered his life.220 The driver
noted that, although he did not condone the refusal of fares, drivers need
to be able to look out for their own personal safety. 221 The city tried to
alleviate some of the economic concerns for the drivers by issuing an
increase in cab fares in turn for the implementation of a "Fare-A-Day"
program where the drivers were required to take a fare a day from an
underserved community. 222 As drivers continued to complain and
consumers continued to file complaints, the dispute eventually led to a
strike of cab service. 223 Although the strike left the visitors for the Fourth
of July weekend limited in finding transportation, the city did not bend
on its stance. 224
The program implemented in Chicago introduces a viable method to
alleviate taxicab discrimination, but the cabbies have significant concerns
as well. The drivers complain that the fare increase does not outweigh
the economic or social consequences surrounding the program. 2 Most

by a passenger for hire, unless it is on its way to pick up a passenger in answer to a call for
service or it is out of service for any other reason." Id. The ordinance requires cabs to
respond to service calls from all neighborhoods within thirty minutes or face a $750 fine or
license suspension or revocation. Id.
219 Gary Washburn, Cab Service Woes Continue, City's Consumer Chief Says, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
26, 1999, at N3. In the first ten months of 1998, 120 drivers were found guilty by city
hearing officers of violating the ordinance prohibiting the refusal of fares to underserved
neighborhoods. Id.
220 McCann, supra note 166. Steve Wiedersberg, President of the Chicago Professional
Taxicab Drivers Association, filed the lawsuit, alleging it violated his "14th Amendment
right to personal security." Id. A federal judge later dismissed the suit. See Cab Driver's
Suit Against City Denied, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2000, at C1.
221 McCann, supra note 166. The driver stated, "I should be allowed to act on my gut
feeling that the person who's flagging me down is only doing it to rob and beat me." Id.
222 John-John Williams IV, Taxicab Bias Hits Close to Home, Blacks Say; Snubs, Slurs are
Common Among Complaints, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 2001, at C1.
223 Walters, supra note 170.
The two-thousand member taxicab drivers association
protested the city mandate requiring them to take at least one call a day from underserved,
mostly minority neighborhoods. Id. The cab drivers said "such a rule is impractical
because of the low volume of calls to those areas, and it unfairly restricts their business."
Id.
224 Id. "This sucks," said a passenger who stood with his family at a taxi stand. Id. "I
don't know what we are going to do," as his family had traveled to Chicago from
Milwaukee for the Fourth of July holiday and was unable to get taxicab service. Id.
225 Id. The drivers complained that the requirement is nearly impossible because most
drivers would never receive one of the one thousand estimated calls a day. Id.
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fares to underserved neighborhoods occupy more of the drivers' time
because destinations are farther than the normal service, and the drivers
are often unable to retain a return fare. 226 Furthermore, no plan has been
implemented to ease safety concerns when the drivers are sent into
dangerous neighborhoods. 227 Despite the efforts and attempts to
contend with common carrier discrimination, access to taxis remains
limited, and actually hailing one is still a chore for many of Chicago's
228
black residents and those living in underserved neighborhoods.
New York City took an arguably more aggressive approach to
taxicab discrimination by setting up a program in which drivers who
discriminate will have their licenses suspended on the spot and their cars
impounded and held at police precincts. 229 Undercover sting operations
are frequently executed in order to catch drivers who ignore the
policy. 230 Many drivers complain that this policy is overstepping the law
by depriving them of their livelihood on the basis of an accusation,
advancing a denial of due process claim.231 The drivers have a
significant concern, since most drivers depend on their cabs to create
enough revenue to pay for the lease expenses, and confiscating the cabs
on allegations significantly hinders their livelihood. 232 Although the
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission does offer a post-

226

Id.

227 McCann, supra note 166.
M2 Williams, supra note 222. Vincent Williams, a Chicago native, says he sometimes asks
women friends to hail cabs for him since "females are less of a threat, and drivers will stop
for them." Id. Other customers report that they have had cabdrivers lock the doors so that
they could not get into the car. Id. One woman reports that since most of her friends have
been passed up before, they must now take the bus. Id.
229
Pete Donohue, Taxi Union Rips Sting: Crackdown Will Cause Slaying of Cabbie, Leader
Says, DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 12, 1999, at 4. The policy was announced after Danny
Glover filed a racial-bias complaint. Id.
230
NYC Cabbies Fare O.k. in Response to Sting, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at C14. The
program was named "Operation Refusal" and teams of undercover police officers and taxi
inspectors, black and white, hailed cabs throughout the Manhattan area. Id.
231
Somini Senqupta, More Cabdrivers Are Cited in Part 2 of City Campaign Against
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1999, at B3. Danny Glover returned to New York for a
forum aimed at ending cabbie bias and agreed that the crack down was harsh stating, "I
trust conscientious people in a democratic society are capable of having a dialogue to settle
their differences and explore ways of dealing with issues. Compromise, understanding
and dialogue. Once we have that, we're capable of coming up with our own solutions."
See Donohue, supra note 229.
232
Daniel Ackman, City Denies Due Process to Cabbies, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 2000, at A51.
Ackman reports that by the time the cabbie receives a full hearing, weeks or months have
passed; meanwhile, the suspension continues. Id.
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deprivation hearing, many times the economic damage is already too
233
significant for the driver to recover.
Since the popularized attention brought by Danny Glover's racebased denial of access to a New York cab and Guiliani's "get tough"
sting operations to target discriminating drivers, New York City has
produced an alarm which rings out for reform in the taxicab industry. 234
As proposals filter in from New York City Borough Presidents and
taxicab associations, it is evident that the two sides advance different
objectives. 235 One must sift through the competing interests to determine
whether the problem stems from racism or from well-founded principles
of economics and safety since there often is a difference between drivers
who refuse fares based on race and those who refuse to take a passenger,
236
regardless of race, to a truly dangerous area.
Whether the problem is found in ambiguous statutes and
interpretations or overreaching programs designed to eradicate taxicab
discrimination, what is evident is that a balancing of social policy and
cab driver concerns is needed in order to create a new solution to the
problem of race discrimination by taxicab drivers. An answer may be to
revive and apply the duty to serve to the tenets of cab services while
purporting new safety requirements and driver incentives to assure
compliance so that no passenger becomes a victim of taxicab
discrimination.

233 Id.
234 Peter Demarco, Taxi ProposalsAim to Put Brakes on Bias, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar.
15, 2001, at 3; see Annie Ciezadlo & Dan Janison, Seeking Solutions; Glover Joins Discussion on
Cabbie Relations with Blacks, NEWSDAY, Dec. 6, 1999, at A8. Glover, once a taxi driver in San
Francisco, called for "citizen action, not punitive action," as a reaction to New York City's
policy to take any cabbie off the job when they were charged with discrimination. Ciezadlo
& Janison, supra. Glover suggested sensitivity training rather than Guiliani's "get tough"
approach of confiscating cabs. Id.
235 Bill Egbert, Beep: Put the Heat on Cabbies, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 16, 2001, at 8.
Some of Manhattan Borough President Virginia Field's recommendations to reduce taxi
service conflict with taxicab operations and their relations to the medallion owner. Id. For
example, Fields suggests that medallion owners be held liable for fare refusals initiated by
their drivers. Id. However, this is illegal since cabbies technically lease their cab for their
shift, rather than working as an employee. Id.
236 Ackman, supra note 214. Ackman cites data from the New York Police Department
and the Taxi and Limousine Commission which shows that "between ninety and ninetynine percent of all cabbies stop for whomever hails them." Id. Ackman further notes that
"these facts give little solace to the black men in particular who are passed by. But talk to
the drivers-including black and Hispanic drivers-and they will tell you with one voice:
The problem is not racism, but economics and safety." Id.
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V. THE TUNE UP: REEMERGENCE OF THE DUTY TO SERVE
AND STRATEGIES TO ERADICATE TAXICAB DISCRIMINATION

Before developing strategies to eradicate taxicab discrimination, it
may prove useful to review the changes in public accommodation law
from its inception. 237 In the period leading up to the Civil War, the
common law duty to serve mandated that any persons holding
themselves out to the public had an obligation to serve their
customers. 238 This law rested on a combination of moral and social
policies. 239 In addition, businesses that voluntarily held themselves out
to serve the public were held to their commitment. 240 What is different
from that period, compared to the common carrier precepts today, is that
it was recognized that property owners had an obligation to serve the
241
public, as well as their individual property rights.
From the time of the Civil War until the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
public accommodation law was constantly changing, mostly involving
the question of whether access to public accommodations should be
extended to black Americans. 242 The ambiguities in the laws, as well as
the ambiguities of a common notion of civil rights, helped to
substantially narrow the common law duty to serve. 243 The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 attempted to alter the social practice of racial discrimination,
causing the new idea of public accommodation laws to emerge as a
mixture of the Jim Crow model, which authorized exclusion, and the
common law duty to serve. 244
A.

Washing the Windshield:
Accommodation Statutes

Cleaning Up the Ambiguities in Public

Litigation of taxicab discrimination, when predicated on the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, has been infrequent, arguably as a result of the
ambiguities surrounding the law, as well as other social and economic

237 See supranotes 26-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common law duty
to serve.
238 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
242 See supra Part II for a discussion of the changes in public accommodation laws.
243 See supra Part IV.A for an examination of the ambiguities found in modem public
accommodation statutes.
244 See supra notes 184-99 and accompanying text.
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factors. 245 However, attempting to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
explicitly include common carriers may be too burdensome and difficult
to consider because of the need for immense time, lobbying efforts, and a
large contingency of support.246 Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV,
Congress may have intended only to lay the foundation for eradicating
discrimination by leaving Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an open
and broad statute, leaving room for leeway in its interpretation. 247 Thus,
a more feasible solution may be for states to author public
accommodation statutes in order to redefine the idea of public
accommodation law as they pertain to common carriers by including the
common law duty to serve.
The following model statute offers a detailed example of a public
accommodation statute that attempts to alleviate some of the ambiguities
found in the current statutes by incorporating achievements of a few
state laws, while also addressing the difficulties that victims of taxicab
discrimination have encountered. The model statute seeks to include
common carriers in public accommodation laws, as well as reintroduce
the common law duty to serve.
MODEL STATE PUBLICACCOMMODATION STATUTE

General Statement
It is unlawful to deny, directly or indirectly, all persons, no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national
249
origin, disability,248 martial status, or sexual orientation,
full and equal accommodation, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of any place or public accommodation without any
distinction, discrimination,or restriction.25°

See infra this Part, Part V, for a discussion of the ambiguities of current public
accommodation statutes, as well as an examination of social and economic factors that have
lead to infrequent litigation of taxicab discrimination claims.
246 Offering amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is beyond the scope of this Note
but another aspect to consider in reinventing public accommodation laws.
247 See supra 195-98 and accompanying text.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1991).
248
249 Bill Smith, Cab Company's Owner Apologizes for Driver's Refusal to Take Man to Gay Bar,
ST. Louis PosT, Dec. 11, 1999, at 6. In St. Louis, a cab driver refused to take a customer to
an establishment because it was a known "fag bar." Id.
250 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1987).
245
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Commentary
The purpose of this clause is to provide a restriction on
discrimination in places of public accommodation while also providing a
broad functional conception of what is covered under the statute. To
encompass the idea of a flexible statute, direct and indirect denial of
public accommodations is deemed unlawful. This may help to combat
blatant and unconscious instances of racism, specifically those situations
where denial was an indirect result. 251 Furthermore, the inclusion of
marital status and sexual orientation expands the categories historically
covered by state statutes. 25 2 This expansive coverage embraces the
common law duty to serve by requiring places of public accommodation
to uphold their commitment to serve the public by not tolerating
discrimination under any precept. 253
Definition of Public Accommodation
A place of public accommodation shall include, but is not
limited to:
business, accommodation, entertainment,
recreation,refreshment, or transportationfacility,25 4 including
common carriers,25 5 licensed or not, whose goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are
extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the
25 6
public.
Commentary
This section attempts to provide a working definition of a place of
public accommodation. By choosing not to restrict the statute to only the
places listed, it allows discretion in determining what should be
included. Since many state statutes list specific examples of places of

251 See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the motivation behind unconscious racism. By
including indirect, as well as direct denials of public accommodations, unconscious racism
will not be tolerated.
252 Singer, supra note 26, at 1491 (Appendix II) (listing those categories covered under
public accommodation statutes; marital status is included in seventeen states, while sexual
orientation is included in ten state statutes).
253 See supra note 30 and accompanying text for an example of the common law duty to
serve. By requiring the cab driver to fulfill his obligation to the public, there is less room
for arguments purporting that denial of service is a personal choice the cab drivers are
entitled to make.
254

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West Supp. 1999).

255 See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a definition of "common carrier."
2

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01.
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public accommodation such as buses or trolleys, including common
carriers to the list of public accommodations lends a broad definition
which encompasses those places typically covered by the public
accommodation statutes, while also leaving room to include other
257
services that hold themselves out to the public, such as taxicabs.
Definition of Common Carrier
"Common carrier" means any business or agency that is, or
holds itself out to be, available to the public for transportation
of persons, goods, or messages.258
Commentary
In order to ease some of the difficulty in bringing a suit alleging
discrimination by a taxicab driver, it may be important to allude to the
duty of a common carrier to serve the public. This section provides a
broad definition of what is a common carrier while also focusing on its
commitment to the public. As explained in the definition of public
accommodations above, some state statutes lists specific places of public
accommodation which include examples of common carriers. Therefore,
including an open-ended definition would allow for flexibility when
determining what fits into the description of common carrier. 25 9
B.

A Little Body Work and It Is as Good as New:
Municipal Statutes

Redefining Goals of

While redefining common carrier laws may benefit states with many
large cities, not all states may need to focus on reworking their public
accommodation laws. However, enforceable municipal policies may
also prove successful in combating racial discrimination in common
carriers. Since most large cities have individual taxicab commissions, or
license their cab fleet through their commerce commissions, it may prove
more effective to initiate a policy at the local level to meet the individual
The
needs of the communities in which the cab service operates.
following model municipal policy seeks to balance the responsibilities of

See supra note 204 and accompanying text for examples of state statutes with broad
definitions. Using a broad definition of what is covered by the statute may help clear up
some discrepancies as to whether certain types of common carriers are actually governed
by the law.
258 Cf. supra text accompanying note 29 (describing the duties of a common carrier).
259 Cf. supra text accompanying note 29 (describing the duties of a common carrier).
27
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taxicab drivers with the responsibilities of municipalities, as well as
provide initiatives for drivers and cab medallion owners to promote
service to, and operate in, underserved neighborhoods. While they are
not inclusive, these policies are suggestions to remedy the most common
complaints proffered by drivers, owners, and consumers.
MUNICIPAL POLICY REGARDING TAXI SERVICES

Trainingand Testing
The Commission shall conduct road, written, and oral
examinations to test cab drivers' knowledge of rules and
geographyof the city in both complex and practical situations.
This test shall continue to be administrated after the initial
licensing every three years.
All licensed drivers must participate in sensitivity training
regardingrace relations.
All drivers are required to pass a minimum of eighty percent
of the questions.
Commentary
Most cab drivers are required to attend training and participate in
testing before receiving their license. 260 Yet, many cab companies do not
require their drivers to take refresher courses or administer tests in order
to evaluate whether or not the driver had the adequate training to
continue taking fares. This section suggests that cab drivers are retested
after a minimum number of years and required to maintain a certain
proficiency in order to retain their license. This ensures that drivers are
aware of new neighborhood geography, new cab company policies, and
new city policies. Mandatory sensitivity training would also help cab
drivers learn to deal with different situations and all types of customers.
Exposing drivers to many different types of situations may prove helpful

Washburn, supra note 219. Chicago cabbies go through six days of training that
includes a bus tour of the city so that drivers can see for themselves there are great
neighborhoods that are underserved. Id.
260
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in combating generalized race-based stereotypes that often prove to be
261
inaccurate.
Policy Against the Refusal of Fares
The Commission is responsible for educating taxi drivers
about all laws, federal, state, and local, regarding equal
service,free from discrimination.
An adequate complaint process, whereby customers can file
complaints and seek reprisal regarding refusal must be in
place.
A discipline policy, including a process for hearings, must be
clear and understandable by all drivers regarding service
refusals.
The Commission must have accessible offices and schedule
hearings at appropriate times so as to be as convenient and
accessible to the public as possible.
Commentary
Most cab drivers receive minimal training on their duties under
public accommodation laws and the policy against fare refusals. 262 The
Commission should be responsible for ensuring that all drivers receive
adequate education regarding the applicable laws and statutes. In
addition to education, the Commission should have an adequate and
accessible complaint process so that the public may issue complaints. All
drivers should understand the grievance process and any repercussions
they may encounter for failing to follow the antidiscrimination policy.

See supra Part 11.B for a discussion of race-based stereotypes that are present in the
taxicab industry.
of Consumer Services, at http://www.ci.chi.il.us/
262 See Chicago Department
ConsumerServices/courses.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2003). Chicago cab drivers are
offered a four-hour session to inform them of the laws and responsibilities under public
accommodation statutes, and the session costs fifty dollars to attend. Id. Drivers are not
required to attend any other training if the laws or policies change. Id. Requiring
mandatory training will inform the drivers of their responsibilities under public
accommodation laws.
261
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Application of Law Against Service Refusal
The Commission should issue hearing summonses to drivers
when a complaint regardingrefusal is alleged.
The hearing should be held before administrative law judges
who are independentof the Commission.
Administrative law judges have discretion to reject a license,
invoke suspension, mandate further education regarding
service requirements, and elect to impose a fine based on
driver history, circumstances of the incident, and other
mitigatingfactors.
Commentary
In order to address complaints filed by consumers, the Commission
should have an adequate hearing process. An administrative law judge
who is independent of the Commission shall oversee all hearings. The
penalties for violation of these policies should be fair according to the
type of infraction so that cab drivers' rights are not unjustly affected. If
suspension or confiscation of a car is warranted, then the driver should
automatically have a timely hearing so as to limit the economic burden
263
of the loss of the ability to work.
Public Education
The Commission shall organize a community outreach
program to inform the public of the complaint process and
their rights as taxicab consumers.
Commentary
Many consumers are not aware of the grievance procedures for
victims of taxicab discrimination. The Commission should have the
responsibility of setting up an outreach program throughout the
communities to educate the public on the remedies available to them.
Conducting town meetings, giving presentations at local civic
organizations, and making pamphlets available that describe the
grievance procedure are just examples of what the Commission may do

263 See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact on the
length of time it takes to receive a hearing regarding a claim of taxicab discrimination and
how the confiscation of a cab burdens the taxi driver.
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in order to provide the public with information regarding the complaint
procedures.
Taxi Medallion264 Owner's Responsibility
The Commission shall implement a regulatory device to notify
medallion owners of drivers who repeatedly refuse to service
customers.
Taxi Medallion Owners shall work with the Commission to
install security cameras, shields, and equip cars with "9-1-1
only" cell phones.
Taxi Medallion Owners must have eighty percent of their cab
fleet equipped with some type of mechanism or be subjected to
fines.
Commentary
While drivers are responsible for their individual actions, medallion
owners should also be notified of repeated instances of service refusal.
Forming a partnership with the medallion owners to alleviate
discrimination by drivers may increase pressure on the cabbies to follow
the regulations and policies. This may decrease the likelihood of
continuous discrimination if the medallion owners are notified and can
speak to the drivers regarding their behavior and, furthermore, discuss
the relevant law and policies regarding taxicab discrimination.
Another main concern of taxi drivers is their personal safety when
sent into dangerous neighborhoods. Taxi medallion owners and the
Commission should work with the drivers to ensure that every cab be
equipped with some type of security device to protect the driver and
deter crime. Many cities have started to implement safety measures,
such as cab-cams and bullet-proof glass barriers, so that cab drivers may
feel safer when working. 265 If drivers feel protected in their cars, it is less
likely they will refuse fares for fear of their personal safety.

264 A medallion is "a permit issued by a governmental agency to operate a taxicab."
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1193 (2d ed. 1987). An owner of

this permit leases cabs to individual drivers under the aquired medallion.
265 Amy Worden, NYC Taxis Get Anti-Crime "Cabby Cams;" Images Hoped to Nail Criminals,
Fare Beaters, at http://www.apbonline.com/safetycenter/ transport/ 1999/11/17/Cabcam
1117_01.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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Responsibility of the Taxicab Commission
The Commission shall initiate strict enforcement of important
safety and public service regulations and, furthermore,ensure
that these regulationsare not used to raise revenue.
The Commission shall be fair, reasonable, and sensitive to the
complexities of driving a taxi.
If the Commission elects to have "testers" or an "inspection"
program whereby the Commission initiates random testing of
taxicab services, the testers and inspectors must be
appropriately supervised and held accountable for fair
enforcement of the law.
The Commission shall ensure that taxi courts are streamlined
and organized to minimize waiting times and advance
efficient reparation.
The Commission shall work with the municipality to erect taxi
stands in underserved neighborhoods that are in well-policed
and well-traveled routes to ease the burden on cab drivers to
pick up returnfares.
The Commission shall ensure that the rights of Taxi Medallion
Owners and taxi drivers are protected.
Commentary
The Commission, while implementing policies designed to alleviate
racial discrimination, should be sensitive to the complexities of driving a
taxi. This may require the taxicab drivers' associations to partake in
strategic planning sessions or have substantial input in policy decisions.
While the Commission's main goal is to operate an efficient and fair
service, it must also be aware of the difficulties many cab drivers face on
a daily basis with respect to economic pressures and safety concerns.
The Commission may ease economic burdens and safety concerns by
working with the city to erect taxi stands, similar to bus stops, on welltraveled and policed locations within the underserved neighborhoods so
that cabbies may have an increased chance of picking up a return fare
266
and feel more comfortable in doing so.

266

See

C.

VIRGINIA

FIELDS,

MANHATTAN

BOROUGH

PRESIDENT,

CONFRONTING

DISCRIMINATION IN THE TAXI INDUSTRY: A ROADMAP TO BETTER TAXI SERVICE vi (2001). See
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VI. CONCLUSION

By reintroducing the common law duty to serve into public
accommodation statutes and specifying the duty of a taxicab driver to
fulfill his obligation to the public, consumers may find it easier to bring a
claim of taxicab discrimination. Currently, the ambiguities found in Title
II of the Civil Rights Act, state public accommodation laws, and
overreaching municipal policies regarding the duties of common carriers
create many obstacles for those who are victims of race discrimination to
bring suit, while also burdening cabbies who fear for their personal
safety. The current law allows little hope for reparation since it is often
silent as to whether common carriers are included as a place of public
accommodation. Furthermore, the municipal policies that are proposed
and adopted by some of the nation's largest cities fail to balance the
needs of taxicab drivers and the complexities surrounding the
profession.
This Note asserts that by reintroducing the common law duty to
serve and also implementing safety programs and incentives for taxicab
drivers to service underserved neighborhoods, a balance may be reached
so that minority consumers may equally access taxicab fleets. The model
state public accommodation statute imparts a more direct responsibility
on common carriers to fulfill their obligations to the public by codifying
the common law duty to serve. The model municipal policy balances the
needs of consumers and drivers alike by implementing continuous
training and safety measures so that both passengers and drivers feel
safe and comfortable hailing or driving a cab. By clarifying the duty of
taxicab drivers and balancing both the needs of cabbies and consumers, a
realignment of public accommodation laws may procure a place where
both the popular actor Danny Glover and all taxicab consumers can hail
a cab with no hesitation.
Danita L. Davis*

also supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text for an explanation of why serving
underserved neighborhoods may prove burdensome for drivers.
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